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United Nations pension system

Report of the Fifth Committee

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I. Introduction

1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 17 September 2004, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "United Nations pension system" and to allocate it to the Fifth Committee.

2. The Fifth Committee considered the item at its 16th, 17th and 31st meetings, on 28 and 29 October and 15 December 2004. Comments and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary records (A/C.5/59/SR.16, 17 and 31).

3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board on its fifty-second session;[1]

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund (A/C.5/59/11);

(c) Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/59/447).

4. At the 16th meeting, on 28 October, the Chairman of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board introduced the report of the Board and the Under-Secretary-General for Management, Representative of the Secretary-General for the Investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, introduced the report of the Secretary-General on the investments of the Fund (see A/C.5/59/SR.16).

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 9* (A/59/9 and Add.1).

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II. Consideration of draft resolution A/C.5/59/L.14

5. At the 31st meeting, on 15 December, the Committee had before it a draft resolution entitled "United Nations pension system" (A/C.5/59/L.14), which was submitted by the Chairman on the basis of informal consultations coordinated by the representative of Jordan.

6. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.5/59/L.14 without a vote (see para. 8).

7. After the adoption of the draft resolution, the representative of Ecuador made a statement in explanation of position (A/C.5/59/SR.31).

III. Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

8. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

United Nations pension system

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 51/217 of 18 December 1996, 53/210 of 18 December 1998, 55/224 of 23 December 2000 and 57/286 of 20 December 2002, section V of its resolutions 54/251 of 23 December 1999 and 56/255 of 24 December 2001, and section X of its resolution 58/272 of 23 December 2003,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board on its fifty-second session,[1] the report of the Secretary-General on the investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund[2] and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,[3]

I
Actuarial matters

Recalling section I of its resolution 57/286,

Having considered the results of the actuarial valuation of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund as at 31 December 2003 and the observations thereon by the Consulting Actuary of the Fund, the Committee of Actuaries and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board,

1. *Takes note* of the developments with respect to the actuarial surplus of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, which went from 0.36 per cent of pensionable remuneration as at 31 December 1997 to 4.25 per cent of pensionable remuneration as at 31 December 1999 to 2.92 per cent of pensionable remuneration as at 31 December 2001 and to 1.14 per cent of pensionable remuneration as at 31 December 2003, and, in particular, of the opinions on those developments provided by the Consulting Actuary and the Committee of Actuaries, as reproduced in annexes VII and VIII, respectively, to the report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board on its fifty-second session;[1]

2. *Also takes note* of the Board's agreement with the recommendation of the Committee of Actuaries that most of the surplus should be retained;

3. *Further takes note* of the view of the Committee of Actuaries and the recommendation of the Board that the current contribution rate of 23.7 per cent of pensionable remuneration should be maintained;

4. *Takes note* of the Board's approval of the terms of reference for the Committee of Actuaries, and notes that the Standing Committee of the Board will

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[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 9* (A/59/9 and Add.1).

[2] A/C.5/59/11.

[3] A/59/447.

consider in 2005 provisions that would allow for the possible appointment of ad hoc members to the Committee of Actuaries;

5. *Concurs*, in accordance with article 13 of the Regulations of the Fund and with a view to securing continuity of pension rights:

(a) With the revised transfer agreements of the Fund with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World Trade Organization, as approved by the Board and set out in annex IX to the report of the Board,[1] which will supersede existing transfer agreements, effective 1 January 2005;

(b) With the new transfer agreements of the Fund with the Universal Postal Union and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, as approved by the Board and set out in annexes I and II, respectively, to the addendum to the report of the Board,[4] which will become effective 1 January 2005;

6. *Decides*, upon the affirmative recommendation of the Board, that the Inter-Parliamentary Union shall be admitted as a new member organization of the Fund, effective 1 January 2005;

II
Pension adjustment system

Recalling section II of its resolution 57/286,

Having considered the reviews carried out by the Consulting Actuary, the Committee of Actuaries and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board, as set out in the Board's report,[1] of various aspects of the pension adjustment system,

1. *Takes note* of the recommendation of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board of a phased approach to the elimination of the 1.5 per cent reduction in the first consumer price index adjustments due after retirement, with effect from 1 April 2005, and also takes note of the Board's recommendation that the two-track pension adjustment system of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund be amended to provide for an adjustable minimum guarantee at 80 per cent of the United States dollar-track amount, also with effect from 1 April 2005;

2. *Approves*, accordingly, with effect from 1 April 2005, the changes in the pension adjustment system set out in the annex to the present resolution, namely:

(a) A phased approach in the elimination of the 1.5 per cent reduction in the first consumer price index adjustments;

(b) The addition of a new provision under the two-track pension adjustment system for an adjustable minimum guarantee at 80 per cent of the United States dollar-track amount, with the understanding that, under the two-track pension adjustment system, benefits are subject to a maximum of 110 or 120 per cent of the local currency track, depending on the date of separation from service, and that the Board will continue to review the costs/savings of all the modifications introduced since 1992 with respect to the two-track feature of the pension adjustment system

[4] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 9* (A/59/9/Add.1).

and will report thereon to the General Assembly every two years on the occasion of the actuarial valuations of the Fund;

3. *Requests* the Board to review the benefit of the two-track system vis-à-vis the United States dollar track for both the beneficiaries and the Fund as a whole, taking into account the effect of the adjustable minimum guarantee at 80 per cent of the United States dollar-track amount on the utilization rate of the two-track system, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session;

4. *Takes note* of the Board's intention to address in 2006, subject to a favourable actuarial valuation as at 31 December 2005, the possible total elimination of the balance of the 1.5 per cent reduction and, on an equal footing, the possible elimination of the limitation on the right to restoration based on length of prior service;

5. *Decides* not to consider any further proposals to enhance or improve pension benefits until action is taken on the issues contained in section I, paragraph 4, and section II, paragraphs 2 and 3, of its resolution 57/286;

6. *Invites* the Board to provide information on the special situation of pensioners living in countries having undergone dollarization and on possible proposals to attenuate the adverse consequences arising therefrom;

III
Financial statements of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund and report of the Board of Auditors

Having considered the financial statements of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund for the biennium ended 31 December 2003, the audit opinion and report of the Board of Auditors thereon, the information provided on the internal audits of the Fund and the observations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board,[1]

1. *Takes note* of the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors, as described in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its report on the accounts of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund for the biennium ended 31 December 2003,[5] and stresses the need for the Fund to comply fully and in a timely manner with all recommendations of the Board of Auditors;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the approval of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board of an internal audit charter, which recognizes and incorporates policy changes for the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the Secretariat;

3. *Notes* that the Standing Committee will consider, in 2005, the desirability of and possible terms of reference for an audit committee of the Board;

IV
Administrative arrangements of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund

Recalling section VII of its resolution 51/217, section V of its resolutions 52/222, 53/210 and 54/251, section IV of its resolution 55/224, section V of its resolution 56/255, section IV of its resolution 57/286 and section X of its resolution

[5] Ibid., *Supplement No. 9* (A/59/9), annex XI.

58/272 concerning the administrative arrangements and expenses of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund,

1. *Takes note* of the information set out in paragraphs 134 to 136 of the report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board[1] on the revised budget estimates for the biennium 2004-2005;

2. *Also takes note* of the upward trend in the administrative expenses of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund and of the intention of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to further consider the matter in the context of the Fund's budget proposals for the biennium 2006-2007;

3. *Approves* additional resources in the amount of $5,340,700 for the biennium 2004-2005 for administrative costs of the Fund, noting that the revised estimates for the biennium would amount to a total appropriation of $41,011,800 for administrative costs;

4. *Takes note* of the arrangements for leasing office space to accommodate in New York, outside United Nations Headquarters, the Fund secretariat and the Investment Management Service;

V
Size and composition of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board and the Standing Committee

Stressing the importance of fair representation of participating organizations, including the General Assembly, in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board and the Standing Committee,

1. *Takes note* of the information set out in paragraphs 200 to 210 of the report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board[1] concerning the review of the size and composition of the Board and its Standing Committee and the decision of the Board that the matter should be further studied by the Working Group established to carry out that review, for consideration by the Standing Committee in 2005 and the Board in 2006;

2. *Urges* the Board to explore the possibility of meeting annually for a shorter duration and to report its conclusions, including all financial and administrative implications associated with that possibility, to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session;

VI
Other matters

1. *Takes note* of the agreement of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board:

(a) To make no changes to the current methodology used in the determination of final average remuneration but to consider at the meeting of its Standing Committee in 2005 a study containing actuarial cost assessments of a proposed early retirement protection measure, together with both the positive features and the anomalies that might arise as a consequence;

(b) To consider at the meeting of its Standing Committee in 2005 a report on a possible provision to allow for the purchase by participants in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund of additional years of contributory service;

(c) To consider at the meeting of its Standing Committee in 2005 possible applications for membership in the Fund from the International Organization for Migration and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas;

(d) To consider at its session in 2006 a study on all benefit provisions relating to family benefits;

(e) To consider at its session in 2006 a study, to be carried out in consultation with the medical directors of the common system, on disability issues;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the progress report on the Fund's management charter, which introduced specific goals and objectives, a detailed action plan for achieving such goals and the status report on the implementation of each goal;

3. *Takes note* of the arrangements with respect to the comprehensive review of pensionable remuneration that is to be carried out by the International Civil Service Commission in close cooperation with the Board, and also takes note of the timetable and framework for the required close collaboration between the two bodies;

VII
Investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund,[2] as well as the observations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board set out in paragraphs 99 to 102 of its report;[1]

2. *Also takes note* of the significant increase in the market value of the Fund's assets and the positive returns achieved during the biennium;

3. *Notes* that a comprehensive review will be carried out of the investment policies and practices of the Investment Management Service with a view to addressing the findings and recommendations contained in the audit reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the Secretariat and the Board of Auditors;

4. *Takes note* of the Board's approval of the terms of reference for the Investments Committee, effective 1 January 2005;

VIII
Diversification of investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund

Recalling its resolutions 36/119 A to C of 10 December 1981,

1. *Takes note* of the increase of investments of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund in developing countries, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session on the steps and efforts undertaken to increase, to the maximum extent possible, investments in developing countries;

2. *Reaffirms* the policy of diversification of the investments of the Fund across geographical areas, wherever this serves the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the Fund, in accordance with the four criteria of safety, profitability, liquidity and convertibility;

IX

Implementation of the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investment Management Service of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund

Recalling its resolution 58/279 of 23 December 2003,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General,[6]

Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General.[6]

Annex

Changes to the pension adjustment system of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund

Section H. Subsequent adjustments of the benefit

Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 20:

"Effective 1 April 2005, the reduction in the initial adjustments due after separation shall be by 1.0 percentage point; with respect to benefits to which the 1.5 percentage point reduction was applied before 1 April 2005, there shall be a 0.5 percentage point increase in the first adjustments due on or after 1 April 2005."

Section I. Payment of the benefit

Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 23:

"The limitations described in (a) and (b) above shall not result in a benefit's being smaller than either the United States dollar base amount determined in accordance with the Regulations of the Fund or 80 per cent of the adjusted United States dollar-track amount."

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[6] A/58/725.

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Joint Inspection Unit

Implementation of results-based management in the United Nations organizations: part I of the series on managing for results in the United Nations system

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Implementation of results-based management in the United Nations organizations: part I of the series on managing for results in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2004/6).

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IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

PART I

OF THE SERIES ON MANAGING FOR RESULTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

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ACRONYMS

AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CEB	Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN)
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GMS	Global Management System (WHO)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMDIS	Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (UN)
IRIS	Integrated Resource Information System (ILO)
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
KIMRS	Key Item Management Reporting System (UN)
MTP	Medium-Term Plan
MTS	Medium-term Strategy
MYFF	Multi-Year Funding Framework
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PIRES	Programme Planning, Implementation, Reporting and Evaluation System (FAO)
RBB	Results-Based Budgeting
RBM	Results-Based Management
SISTER	System of Information on Strategies, Tasks, and Evaluation of Results (UNESCO)
SMART	specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The introduction of the overview document of the series of reports on managing for results in the United Nations system described the context in which the UN organizations initiated their efforts at the end of the nineties to establish results-based management (RBM) systems.[1] As indicated in the overview, some of these efforts were more fruitful than others with varying levels of progress achieved in establishing such systems among the organizations of the UN family.

2. Based on their analysis, the Inspectors have identified the process of planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation; human resources management; and management information systems as the main pillars for the development of a solid RBM system. Therefore, the Inspectors are producing this series on management for results in the UN system composed of three reports, with special focus on these issues. The Inspectors emphasize that the three reports, together with the overview document, should be considered in conjunction with one another, to have a better sense of the challenges facing the effective implementation of RBM in the UN organizations.

3. Considering that it would be premature at this stage to attempt to evaluate the impact of the new policies and systems introduced in the majority of the UN organizations, the Unit has chosen to contribute to the implementation of changes proposed by submitting through this series of reports a list of critical success factors through which the concepts developed in recent years can be operationalized. The Unit hopes that this list can offer to its participating organizations a benchmarking framework, or "scorecard", to measure their progress towards RBM.

4. This first part introduces the concept and definition of RBM, and identifies a number of critical success factors at the corporate level that the Inspectors believe are essential for an effective implementation of RBM in the United Nations organizations. The methodology applied in the preparation of this part and the rest of the series is described in the overview document. Like the two other parts, a blueprint of this text was discussed in a review meeting held in June 2004, which was open to all the Unit's participating organizations, and in which most of them were represented by their competent officials. The active and constructive participation in this meeting was an important factor in refining this benchmarking framework.

5. While the Inspectors are aware that there is no single "roadmap" to RBM, and that the specific mandate, structure, size and constraints of each organization will dictate to a great extent the managerial choices they make in the next few years, they believe that reforms can be carried out more effectively if lessons learnt are shared and best practices disseminated. Therefore, selected case illustrations, in the form of examples of policies, processes or practices that appear to encompass one or several of these success factors, are highlighted in boxes. The main challenges and difficulties faced by some of the organizations in trying to implement these new policies are also discussed, and attention is drawn to the risks associated with a number of current practices. The Inspectors would like to emphasize that the selected case illustrations are not exhaustive, and that their number was limited by the need for brevity, and the desire to ensure that the cited cases are corroborated through the Inspectors' missions and interviews of officials in the organizations concerned.

6. The Inspectors wish to thank all those who have contributed to the report.

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[1] See JIU/REP/2004/5 "Overview of the series of reports on managing for results in the United Nations system".

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Concept and General Considerations

Box 1: RBM Concept and definition

RBM is a management approach focused on achieving results; a broad management strategy aimed at changing the way agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving results) as the central orientation.[2]

Box 2: Key RBM techniques

Key RBM techniques include: [3]

- Formulating objectives (results)
- Selecting indicators to measure progress towards each objective
- Setting explicit targets for each indicator to judge performance
- Regularly collecting data on results to monitor performance
- Reviewing, analyzing and reporting actual results vis-à-vis the targets
- Integrating evaluations to provide complementary performance information
- Using performance information for purposes of accountability, learning and decision-making

7. While a considerable amount of literature is available about RBM concepts and techniques, the Inspectors would like to emphasize that the techniques of RBM, by themselves, are not sufficient to achieve effective results in the organizations of the UN system. RBM techniques must be supplemented by organizational policies and strategies, such as human resources, information management and learning strategies, if they are to have an impact on programme effectiveness. Indeed, the list of critical success factors proposed by the Inspectors in this report attempts to address some of these policy imperatives at the organizational level.

8. The Inspectors, therefore, would caution against turning RBM into a bureaucratic process in itself. RBM has to be translated into improved programming and service delivery for the end users in order to meet its expectations and render justice to the investments deployed in it by the majority of the UN system organizations.

9. The Inspectors also reiterate their conviction stated in the introduction that there is no single "roadmap" to RBM, and that each organization has to adapt RBM to its specificities and mandates. Nevertheless, the Inspectors are equally convinced that a wide range of commonalities exists among the UN organizations, which could constitute a basis for a system-wide harmonization effort for the implementation of RBM in the UN organizations. Otherwise, there is a risk of constantly reinventing the wheel and its consequent waste of

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[2] Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee paper "RBM in the Development Cooperation Agencies: A review of experience", Feb. 2000, adapted.
[3] Ibid, adapted.

efforts and resources, in addition to the risk of setting contradictory practices within the common system. Harmonization is particularly important in the context of joint programming, called for by the Secretary-General in his reform initiatives.[4]

10. The ongoing simplification and harmonization efforts undertaken in the context of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), including on RBM is a good example in this respect and should be built upon system-wide. The CEB machinery should play a more active role in this area.

Box 3: Harmonization is important

In 2002, the OECD, through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), developed a glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management.[5] The glossary's terms and definitions were carefully discussed and analyzed, and benefited from advice and inputs, notably from DAC Members and the academic evaluation community.[6] A Task Force, chaired by the World Bank, led the overall project, in collaboration with the Secretariat. Most UN organizations either use this terminology or adapt it to their own context, including the UNDG.[7] The former UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Evaluation (now known as the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)) also decided to use this glossary as part of its harmonization efforts among the UN evaluation community.[8]

11. It should be also understood that the implementation of RBM is by no means a one-time event. It is rather a process that needs to be undertaken gradually, though in a coherent manner. Implementing RBM requires a fundamental change in the management culture. Changing cultures by its vary nature is a daunting process that requires time and perseverance. Some national experiences prove that many years are needed for an effective implementation of RBM.[9]

12. A pre-requisite towards this change is a commitment at all levels to this management system. Such a commitment should be reflected through the interaction between the main parties and translated into precise tools and mechanisms to put RBM into action.

13. Experience shows that a commitment at the highest level of the organization is essential to orient the organization towards RBM.[10] However, an effective implementation of RBM can only be sustained through a solid institutionalization of RBM, and a conviction by the main parties, including management and staff, that the system does meet their expectations for improved performance, at the individual and organizational levels.

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[4] A/57/387, Action 14.

[5] See the OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management developed by the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf)

[6] The DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, which developed the glossary, consists of about 30 representatives from OECD countries and multilateral development agencies, including the World Bank, UNDP, and regional Development Banks.

[7] See http://www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=823, UNDG website.

[8] Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Evaluation, meeting of 19-20 June 2002, Vienna, Austria.

[9] See, for example, summary of issues discusses and points made in the results-based budgeting retreat sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations in New York (18-20 September 2003).

[10] See ibid, for example.

What are the critical success factors for an effective implementation of RBM in the United Nations?

A. A clear conceptual framework

14. In their review of the status of implementation of results-based management in the UN system, the Inspectors were faced with different definitions and terminology used to reflect the shift to the results-based approach by the organizations. For example, UNDP, UNFPA and WFP clearly use the term results-based management, UNICEF uses results-based programme planning and management, the United Nations uses results-based budgeting (RBB), UNESCO refers to its results approach as results-based programming, management and monitoring. At ILO, the results approach translates into strategic budgeting and at FAO, the approach is implemented through a set of conceptual and procedural advances (Strategic Framework, New Programme Model, enhanced monitoring and evaluation regime), while rarely referring explicitly to results-based management.

15. These differences make it harder to communicate using a common language among the UN organizations. For instance, in the course of the Unit's attempt to develop a system-wide questionnaire on the status of implementation of RBM in the UN system, referred to in the introduction to this report, almost every organization emphasized the need for an individual "tailored" questionnaire to make it, among others, understandable to its managers and staff. More importantly, such variations usually reflect different focus, understanding and perceptions of RBM within the system, and sometimes within the same organization (even within the same department in some instances, as was encountered by the Inspectors), with important implications for the process and the status of implementation of RBM in the various organizations. For example, in many instances, the Inspectors noted that while some programme managers perceive RBM as a management tool, others perceive it as a budgetary technique or even as a mere bureaucratic requirement to justify their resources.

16. While all of the organizations of the UN system are in the midst of implementing the results-based approach in one form or another, some are proving to be more effective and efficient in their ongoing process than others. Generally, the Inspectors found that the group of UN Funds and Programmes (namely UNDP, UNFPA and WFP) are the most methodological and systematic in their implementation of RBM, undoubtedly because their shift to a results-based approach was founded on a clearly developed conceptual framework and guided, inter alia, by the experience of other agencies (including some national agencies).[11] At the outset, these organizations approached RBM as a broad management strategy aimed at achieving changes in the way they operate and where various blocks come together in a coherently planned, albeit gradual, manner to build an effective and solid system of management.

[11] Several studies were prepared for the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, including, for instance, the paper referred to in supra note 2.

Box 4: Conceptual papers are essential

UNDP issued a package of guidance and technical materials to support the introduction of RBM in 1999-2000. It intended to assist UNDP's practitioners, programme stakeholders and national policy makers in understanding: the basic concepts and principles of RBM; the technical tools used to plan, monitor, report and assess results; and how to use indicators to track progress. This RBM Methodology Series comprised three papers about RBM in UNDP: General Principles and Concepts; Technical Note; and Selecting Indicators. They were used to support training entry-level, mid-career and senior staff, mainly from country offices. New guidance was issued to country offices in May 2004 to accompany the MYFF 2004-07, reflecting advances in methods and approaches based on five years of experience.

UNFPA issued a policy statement on RBM highlighting clearly what RBM means at UNFPA. An RBM orientation guide was issued later.

Similarly, WFP produced in 2003 an RBM orientation guide to promote a better understanding of RBM concepts and tools and their applicability to the Organization. The guide serves as the basic and entry tool for all staff.

17. Such conceptual frameworks are essential in setting the stage for the change of culture within the organization needed for an effective implementation of RBM. Most officials in the UN organizations have highlighted this as a major challenge. The conceptual documents are also essential for promoting common understanding of the RBM concept and for harmonizing its tools and terminology within the organization. In addition they relate and adapt RBM to the business and operations of the organization at various levels, emphasize the implications and requirements of such an adaptation, and provide a basis for a time-bound coherent strategy for implementing RBM.

18. On the other hand, at the United Nations and most of the specialized agencies, the Inspectors found that what is lacking is a coherent, holistic approach. The shift to a results-based approach was largely characterized by a focus on the budgeting and programming aspects of management without realizing or emphasizing at the outset the scope of changes required in other areas of management for an effective implementation of an RBM system. In some instances, the shift was mainly in the vision and format without being effectively translated into improved methods of work or support by the administrative, financial and information systems in the organization. A fragmented approach to RBM has characterized the shift in many of these organizations. The process became mainly a learning-by-doing exercise.

19. At the United Nations, for example, high-level officials interviewed recognized the lack of a solid foundation on which to base the shift to RBM and the attendant need for a strategic management approach to ensure coherence among several management initiatives launched in various departments of the organization. The Inspectors also noted that while a few departments were relatively more advanced in their understanding and implementation of RBM, most departments were lagging behind, with a major department still struggling with conceptual issues among its own managers. The Inspectors recall that the JIU recommended in 1999 that "a comprehensive assessment of changes that would be required to assure the readiness of the organization for RBB, regarding areas such as regulations, procedures,

management information systems, and training" be included in future reporting to member states.[12]

Box 5: Culture change is a significant challenge

At the end of 2002, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) identified several challenges and steps needed "to bring the implementation of RBB to the next level" [at the UN],[13] among them the need for a significant culture change and for staff at all levels to become familiar with the concepts and terms of RBB.

20. At FAO, the New Programme Model (NPM), developed to reflect a results-based approach to budgeting, was devised and applied mainly to the technical departments. FAO has not yet applied a logical Framework approach to the activities of its country offices, and the matter is still under consideration. Both ILO and WHO are at the initial stages of adapting their management systems to support an effective implementation of RBM despite initiating their shift to strategic budgeting in 2000. WHO, for example, is revisiting its results-based management framework to simplify the planning, monitoring and evaluation processes in order to make the framework a more effective, rational, relevant and useful management tool.

21. Once a clear conceptual framework for RBM is developed and shared among the organization's main parties, a firm commitment to its implementation and institutionalization should be demonstrated through a legislative adoption committing Member States and management to this new approach, based on a genuine understanding of the scope of changes required throughout the organization.

Benchmark 1

A clear conceptual framework for RBM exists as a broad management strategy

B. The respective responsibilities of the main parties

22. RBM is a management approach focused on achieving results. This implies that for an effective implementation of an RBM system, this shift of focus should extend to the operational modes of all the main parties involved in the organization's governance, namely its Member States, the secretariat (programme managers and staff), and the oversight bodies.

23. In their review, the Inspectors note that despite the fact that the shift to a results-based approach was generally sanctioned through the legislative bodies of the UN system organizations, member states in many instances found it hard to shift their focus towards results and outcome-driven programming and budgeting from the previous input-driven process, making it harder sometimes for the secretariats, and even for oversight bodies, to adapt their methods of work to a results-based approach in an efficient manner.

24. The fact that the implementation of an effective RBM system is still at an early stage in most UN organizations certainly contributes to this general slow shift of focus. However, the Inspectors are convinced that a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the organization's governance in the context of an RBM system is essential to move the process forward efficiently and avoid setbacks. Such a division of labor should be

[12] JIU/REP/99/3.
[13] A/57/474, dated 15 October 2002.

clearly articulated in a concise document developed in a participatory manner among the parties, and to which their commitment is formalized through an explicit consent by Member States to the roles and responsibilities allocated in the document.

25. It is obvious, for example, that the Member States have the primary responsibility in setting the strategic goals and objectives for the organizations. It is also the primary responsibility of the secretariat to satisfy the Member States that these goals and objectives are translated into effective programmes and activities that contribute to or ensure their achievements, and that the resources are used efficiently. Similarly, it is the primary responsibility of the oversight bodies to satisfy the Member States that the secretariat's efforts in doing so are deployed in the most effective and efficient manner, and to guide the secretariat's efforts towards more efficiency, as appropriate. It should be emphasized that oversight is not a substitute for good management.

26. To assume those primary responsibilities, though, an active interaction is needed among the parties, through clearly established tools, mechanisms and procedures. Those points and means of interaction need to be clearly defined, and the results expected from them need to be clarified and shared among the parties in the context of the primary responsibilities of each. This would enhance accountability and avoid negative implications on the process.

27. In this context, the active participation of programme managers is necessary throughout the discussion of their programmes, including at the legislative level. Only then, could an RBM culture be promoted, a sense of ownership to the programmes fostered, and accountability claimed and exercised.

28. A clearly articulated and agreed upon division of labor would also enhance the important trust factor between the Member States and the secretariats. The Unit, in several previous reports, [14] had emphasized the need for a climate of trust and understanding between the Member States and the secretariat and consensus among the Member States for a successful implementation of any reforms. In many instances, the Inspectors noticed that micromanagement has been exercised by some of the same Member States advocating RBM. In a climate of trust, supported by a clear division of labour, the Member States should refrain from interfering in the internal management of the organizations whether collectively, through the legislative organs or their groupings, or individually.

29. Once responsibilities are clearly identified and approved by concerned parties, a strict adherence by each party to its share is important in all policy and management aspects of the organization, in particular throughout the planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation cycle.

Benchmark 2

The respective responsibilities of the organization's main parties are clearly defined

C. Long-term objectives (expected long-term results) for the Organization

30. In their shift to a results-based approach, most organizations of the UN system recognized, albeit at different stages of the process, the need for strategic frameworks that provide vision and overall direction to the organization in the long- and/or- mid-term. The JIU, in its report on the "Review of the United Nations Budgetary Process" highlighted the experience of the UN organizations in this regard, identified some common features and

[14] See, for example JIU reports JIU/REP/99/3 and JIU/REP/2003/2.

elements in those policy papers or strategic plans, and recommended that such a framework be developed at the United Nations.[15] Indeed, most national agencies that adopted a results-based management system developed and issued their corporate strategic frameworks under various names.

Box 6: Examples of national corporate strategic frameworks[16]

a. United States Agency for International Development's strategic framework (USAID)
b. United Kingdom Government Department for International Development's output and performance analysis (DFID)
c. Australian Agency for International Development's performance information framework (AusAID)
d. Danish Agency for International Development's output and outcome indicator system (Danida)

31. An essential common element in all of those strategic documents is the articulation of the organization's long-term objectives that contribute to the organization's goals. The emergence of a set of internationally agreed goals through the Millennium Declaration[17] and a series of major United Nations conferences and summits since the early 1990s have provided important guidance for each UN organization to identify its own priority goals that supports and relate to the organization's mission. For instance, while achieving universal primary education is an internationally agreed goal,[18] some organizations within the UN system can more immediately and logically identify this goal as a priority than others, and a contribution from them is clearly expected in view of their specific mandate and sphere of competence.

Box 7: The FAO Strategic Framework

Formulation of the FAO Strategic Framework for 2000-2015 constituted a milestone in the organization's shift to a results-based approach. Guided by the outcome of the 1996 World Food Summit, it defined three Global Goals of Member Nations and five Corporate Strategies to address members' needs, with ancillary 12 strategic objectives.

Box 8: The IAEA medium-term Strategy

In IAEA, the first Medium-term Strategy (MTS) detailed the Agency's longer-term goals and the specific objectives for 2001-2005.[19] Three broad substantive goals (pillars) were identified and specific objectives for the medium term were defined under each of the pillars, with performance indicators for each objective included in the MTS. The substantive goals were complemented by two functional goals (related to secretariat's role and management).

32. Once the overall priority goals are identified, the organization's objectives (sub-goals) that contribute to these goals should be defined. These objectives, in the context of the results-based management system, would constitute the critical "results" to be accomplished or assessed by the organization over the period of time covered by its strategic framework. Therefore, these objectives should be specific, clear and verifiable to allow an easy attribution to the role of the organization and an assessment of the performance of the organization over

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[15] JIU/REP/2003/2 (A/58/375), paras. 35-36 and annex.
[16] "Results Based Management in the Development Cooperation Agencies: A Review of Experience", Background Report, DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation.
[17] A/RES/55/2.
[18] Ibid.
[19] The second MTS for IAEA will cover a six-year period (2006-2011).

the long term. Such long-term objectives also allow for better human resources planning within each organization.[20]

33. In a recent report of the JIU on achieving the universal primary education goal of the millennium declaration (Education for All),[21] it was discussed how the UN system organizations have faced their implementation. The main general finding was that after four years of adopting the Millennium goals, there has not been a concerted effort to plan their implementation, which is a major failure. First of all it has not been clearly defined what is expected form the Member States individually and collectively and what is expected from the secretariats. Thus, there is a high risk that none of the goals would be accomplished. Indeed, UNESCO is currently carrying out a strategic review to analyse the progress made and difficulties encountered in the pursuit of Education for All.

Box 9: Desirable characteristics of a statement of objective[22]

a. Statements of results (not means or actions)
b. Precise and simple (easily understood)
c. Measurable
d. One-dimensional (only one result per objective)
e. Logically consistent among levels (reflect cause-effect linkages)

34. Finally, setting the long-term objectives of the organization should be a participatory process, internally so that senior management in the organization can identify with those objectives, assume ownership and use them in making strategic policy and programming decisions, and externally so that member states (and other major concerned parties) of the organization are committed to the agreed upon objectives.

Box 10: A participatory approach is important in developing the corporate strategic framework

The FAO Strategic Framework is the product of extensive consultations over two years (1998-1999) within the Secretariat and with member states and other major partners of FAO, including from the UN system and civil society.

Benchmark 3

Long-term objectives have been clearly formulated for the organization

D. Alignment of Programmes with the organization's long-term objectives

Box 11: Programme management

Making results fit together and add up into major outcomes for the organization, as a whole is what designing strategies is all about. This is the core task of senior management, and indeed permeates all programme management.[23]

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[20] See Chapter IV, Section A of Part III of the series of reports.
[21] JIU/REP/2003/5.
[22] Op. Cit, supra note 2.
[23] Results Based Programming, Management and Monitoring Guide, UNESCO, Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP)/RTC Consultants.

35. Once the longer-term objectives of the organization are defined, an alignment of its programmes is due. Usually, this is primarily done through a cascading process of the long-term objectives of the organization that ensures that the objectives set at the various operational levels of the organization (e.g. programmes, sub-programmes, projects) link in a logical way to the level above. The characteristics highlighted above for the objective statements are valid for the objectives at the various levels of operations.

36. At many UN organizations, this process has usually entailed a streamlining, regrouping and reformulation of the programmes to provide better focus for the work of the organization around the identified long-term objectives. For example, at WHO, programmes were regrouped and the three levels of the organization (global, regional and country) were integrated with the same overall objectives. ILO reformulated and regrouped its programmes under four strategic objectives and 10 operational objectives, in addition to six crosscutting or shared policy objectives.[24] FAO introduced a programme model with three types of entities and identified sixteen priority areas for interdisciplinary action (PAIAS) in its Medium-term Plan.[25]

37. In the case of some highly decentralized organizations, and bearing in mind the country demand, UNDP, for example, while never discarding the notion that planning and assessment could be part of an integrated whole, was cautious in introducing a framework in which country and programme goals cascade neatly from broader organizational objectives. To reconcile the needs of both corporate and operating units (primarily country offices), UNDP opted for a results system during 2000-03 based on the integration of a two-way process, combining a top-down and bottom-up approach. While UNDP continues to explore ideas and tries through innovative approaches to confront and problematize the issue, especially with regard to questions of attribution and aggregation,[26] its results framework has been simplified for 2004-2007 with two tiers at both the corporate and country levels.[27]

Box 12: UNDP Results System; Two-way Process[28]



[24] Op. cit. supranote 15, para. 40.
[25] FAO uses a programme model with three different types of entities: time-bound technical projects, continuing programme activities, and technical services agreements.
[26] The new MYFF, for 2004-07, revitalizes the discussion within UNDP with the introduction of 'core results'. According to UNDP, these core results represent substantive and methodological guidance for country offices to use in framing country programme outcomes in dialogue with their national counterparts. They can, in turn, be used to create substantive clusters of results for corporate analysis.
[27] At the corporate level, UNDP has now five goals comprising thirty service lines (i.e. two tiers), and at the country level, there are two levels, country programme outcomes and project outputs (again, two tiers).
[28] RBM in UNDP: Overview and General Principles, adapted for 2004-2007.

38. In all cases, it is vital that the organization work to avoid a strategic disconnect in its programming at the various levels if it is to implement RBM successfully. At the United Nations, for example, heads of Departments/Offices and the programme managers were requested to prepare and submit their biennial programme plans as Part Two of the new Strategic Framework for 2006-2007, before identifying the longer-term objectives of the Organization. Part One of the Strategic Framework (plan outline),[29] reflecting the longer-term objectives requested by the General Assembly was initiated centrally.[30]

39. It should also be realized that RBM is a flexible approach to planning and decision-making. The tools and techniques needed to implement RBM will necessarily vary, not only among organizations, but also within an organization. Different types of organizational elements will need different approaches and different tools. For example, administrative and service-delivery elements of an organization will address the RBM requirements differently from those entities dealing with substantive or policy issues. But all parts of the organization must address those requirements.[31]

Box 13: RBM is a flexible approach

FAO is currently developing a concept paper to extend its results-based approach to non-technical departments.

Benchmark 4

The organization's programmes are well aligned with its long-term objectives

E. Alignment of resources with the organization's long-term objectives

40. Accounting for results is at the heart of the shift to results-based management in UN organizations. The United Nations General Assembly, in approving the shift to results-based budgeting, noted, "that the measures proposed by the Secretary-General…are intended to provide, in essence, a management tool that should enhance responsibility and accountability in the implementation of programmes and budgets".[32] Therefore, harnessing the organization's resources to achieve its desired objectives, and demonstrating the linkage between resources and results is essential for an effective RBM system.

41. The Inspectors have noted that this area remains a major challenge in effectively implementing RBM in most UN organizations. Most accounting systems in place do not provide information about the alignment of resources with the long-term objectives of the organizations, nor do they allow linking expenditures to objectives. This is important information for management and the Member States in making their resource allocation and programme planning decisions helping, for example, to shift resources from under-performing, obsolete or marginal programmes and activities to more efficient and relevant ones, and to those programmes considered to be of the highest priority.

42. Effective cost accounting systems linking resources to objectives would also allow assessment of the performance level of a programme in relation to the resources provided to it, and the impact of increased, or decreased resources, on the organization's performance as a

[29] A/RES/58/269 of 23 December 2003.
[30] United Nations, Instructions for the Proposed Strategic Framework for the Biennium 2006-2007.
[31] Op. Cit., supra note 23, adapted.
[32] A/RES/55/231 of 23 December 2000.

whole, or on some of its programmes and activities, over different budget cycles. This would enhance accountability by assessing the resource factor in the performance of a programme, versus other administration or management factors.

43. The Inspectors noted the concern expressed by some managers at several UN organizations where the overall level of the budget may be subject to across-the-board reductions based merely on political considerations and without regard to the programmatic implications of such reductions. However, neither the organizations nor the managers are able at this stage to demonstrate in a convincing way the impact that such reductions had or will have on the performance of their programmes and on achieving the desired results.

Box 14: Link resources to results

Due to highly politicized budgetary processes, the level of predictability of resources for programme planning at the UN organizations is generally low, making the need to link resources to results even more urgent for the UN organizations and their credibility.

44. In the same context, predictability of resources becomes an important factor for effective management and programme planning. Since long-term objectives would need, by their nature, several budget cycles to be achieved, managers would need a reasonable level of resource predictability to set their targets to be met during a certain financial period and be held accountable for.

45. The instruments used by the UN system organizations to provide such predictability and to align strategic planning with resources vary, and, so far, so does their level of success in achieving those aims. For instance, the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA and UNICEF adopt multi-year funding frameworks (MYFF) that integrate programme objectives, resources, budget and outcomes over a four-year period. These organizations, faced with attribution and aggregation challenges, are currently striving to achieve a meaningful linkage between their resources and results and to submit results-based budgets at the corporate level.

46. At FAO, the secretariat includes indicative resources to the programmes in the context of the organization's rolling six-year medium-term plan (MTP). Member States, though, take note and emphasize the indicative and non-committal nature of the resources mentioned in MTP. Indeed, the FAO budget for 2004-2005 suffered a cut of almost US$51 million in real terms compared with the 2002-2003 budget. The IAEA secretariat, for its part, produced in March 2004 a "Strategic Issues and Changes" document for the 2006-2007 Programme and Budget, highlighting, at the Major Programmes level, the strategic issues to be addressed through each major programme, the major changes relating to the 2004-2005 cycle, and an indication of the level of resources required. Through this document, the Secretariat sought guidance from the Member States regarding certain additional resource requirements before proceeding with the preparation of its draft programme and budget proposals for 2006-2007.

47. In all cases, practices that lead to a disconnection between resources and expected results should be reviewed, including, for example, at the United Nations, where the budget outline (indicating the overall level of resources estimated for the upcoming biennial programme budget) is to be submitted and considered for approval after consideration and adoption of the Strategic Framework containing the longer-term objectives and the biennial Programme Plan of the organization.[33]

[33] A/RES/58/269 of 23 December 2003.

48. A link between strategic programming and resources is essential. In general, the Inspectors envisage two main options to achieve this linkage. If the programme planning cycle is short (two or three years), budgeting should be merged with programming; the programme budget should be discussed and approved, and the related financial resources appropriated. However, if the programme planning cycle covers a longer period (four years or more), then the executive heads should present a forecast of estimated resources. Those resources should be recognized by member states as a target without necessarily appropriating the overall level of resources. Appropriations could follow on an annual or a biennial basis subject to the performance of the respective programmes.

Box 15: Maximum expenditures are approved for four years at WMO

Guided by an eight-year Long-Term Plan (LTP), the WMO Congress approves "maximum expenditures" for a four-year budgeting cycle. A biennial programme budget is then devised and approved. The [WMO] Secretary-General is empowered to meet emergencies or unforeseen activities in the four-year budgeting period within the "maximum expenditures" level approved.

Benchmark 5

The organization's resources are well aligned with its long-term objectives

F. Effective performance monitoring systems

Box 16: Performance monitoring systems

Performance monitoring systems track and alert managers to whether actual results are being achieved as planned. They are built around a hierarchy of objectives logically linking [the organization's] activities and resources to intermediate results and strategic objectives through cause and effect relationships. For each objective, one or more indicators are selected to measure performance against explicit targets (planned results to be achieved by specific dates). Performance monitoring is an ongoing, routine effort requiring data gathering, analysis, and reporting on results at periodic intervals.[34]

49. Learning and accountability are primary aims of results-based management. In order to achieve these aims, appropriate information has to be gathered, analyzed and reported at an appropriate timing related to the planning and programming cycle. Developing effective monitoring systems is vital in this regard. Several elements are to be taken into account in this context.

[34] USAID, "The Role of Evaluation in USAID", Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS, 1997, supra note 2.

Box 17: Monitoring at UNDP

UNDP defines monitoring as a continuing function that aims primarily to provide the management and main stakeholders of an ongoing intervention (project, programme) with early indications of progress, or lack thereof, in the achievement of results.[35]

50. It is essential at the outset to differentiate between situation monitoring versus performance monitoring.[36] While the former measures change in a condition or a set of conditions, that may or may not directly relate or impact on the programmes of the organization, the latter measures progress in achieving the specific objectives and results of the organization's programmes and activities as they are stipulated in the organization's time-bound implementation plan.

51. For instance, monitoring the progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals of reducing child mortality and improving maternal health is necessary for UNICEF and UNFPA to design and target their programmes, but does not provide in itself the information necessary on the performance of these two organizations' programmes and activities in contributing to achieving those goals. Performance information systems seek to measure that latter performance.

52. Another element to bear in mind in developing a performance monitoring system is that the effectiveness of such systems is a function of the quality of the defined results and the indicators designed to measure the progress towards those results. Well-defined objectives should lead to better-selected indicators and to better designed programmes to meet those objectives. This would also lead to a clearer linkage between the results at various levels of aggregation.

53. In this context, a balance has to be sought between quantitative and qualitative indicators. This balance is most important in the case of those UN organizations for which it is difficult to capture the impact of many of their services and activities in a meaningful or cost-effective quantitative manner. The UN system organizations could also benefit in this regard from the experience of some national agencies where innovative work was done to effectively quantify subjective information.[37]

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[35] UNDP, Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002. The Inspectors found various definitions used to describe the monitoring function in the organizations of the UN system and other organizations. However, a most widely accepted terminology for RBM, including monitoring and evaluation functions, can be found in the OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management developed by the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf). Most UN organizations either use this terminology or adapt it to their own context.

[36] See UNICEF, Programme Policy and Procedure Manual, Programme Operations, Chapter 5 (Monitoring and Evaluation), Revised May 2003.

[37] Supra note 2, Box 16 on USAID, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, April 1998.

Box 18: The SMART way to select indicators

Many organizations have developed their own checklists for selecting indicators that contain key criteria against which the selected indicators are tested. Among them is the popular acronym SMART. A good indicator has to be: Specific; Measurable; Attainable; Relevant; and Trackable.[38]

54. Related to the issue of indicators is the necessity to establish baselines and targets against which progress could be measured over a certain period of time. The Inspectors found that most UN organizations are at an early stage in this process. Some, like the United Nations, introduced baselines and targets for the first time in this ongoing biennium 2004-2005, while others are in the process of establishing such baselines and targets. WIPO, for example, despite its early shift to a results-based approach since 1998, has yet to establish baseline indicators and targets for most of its programmes and activities. It is clear that such a process needs to be developed within and guided by the strategic planning framework of the organization in order to be meaningful and effective.

Performance monitoring and information systems

55. The need for effective performance monitoring systems as an intrinsic part of a successful results-based management strategy has led most organizations of the UN system to review their existing management information systems and reflect on the extent to which those systems support the effective implementation of RBM. Three major approaches are followed by the UN system organizations in this regard.

56. Some organizations, including UNDP, UNFPA, ILO and WHO, decided to replace in phases their legacy systems with Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems covering in an integrated manner, at headquarters and in the field, the programme and budgeting, finance and accounting, and human resources management components. Hence, UNDP, joined by UNFPA, launched the first phase of its ERP system in 2004 with the full range of functions anticipated for 2006. ILO is currently developing its Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) with the aim to implement it initially at headquarters during 2004 and then gradually in the field as from the latter part of the year. As for WHO's Global Management System (GMS), it is still largely at the conceptual phase with the aim to have it fully operational by 2007.

57. Other organizations, including FAO and UNESCO, mainly replaced their programming and budgeting systems with new results-based integrated systems for planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and reporting. Hence, UNESCO developed its System of Information on Strategies, Tasks, and Evaluation of Results (SISTER), while FAO developed its Programme Planning, Implementation, Reporting and Evaluation System (PIRES). Both systems are functional at this stage, with interfacing between them and the respective financial systems in place achieved through additional modules and software solutions. Both systems also envisage an interface in the future with results-based human resources management systems, once those systems are conceived.

58. The United Nations, for its part, opted to enhance its existing Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (IMDIS). Originally developed by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to assist its senior management in tracking the implementation of programme outputs and meeting the performance reporting requirements of the United Nations General Assembly, the system was expanded and enhanced

[38] For more details see supra note 2, Box 6, and RBM in UNDP: Selecting Indicators.

continuously since 1998 to cover the output delivery of other departments, try to make monitoring and reporting on performance more effective, and include the programme components of all sections of the programme budget for 2002-2003, the first programme budget formulated fully in accordance with the RBB format approved by the General Assembly. However, officials interviewed for this report expressed the view that IMDIS, as it stands at this stage, is not user-friendly, and does not take into account the varying performance monitoring requirements in different departments. Incentives to use the system are lacking as programme managers cite inherent difficulties in tracking outputs under current procedures, and the online application does not make the process of continuous monitoring easy.[39]

59. The new version of IMDIS being currently conceptualized will attempt to address some of those concerns. This is mainly being done through the collaboration of DESA, the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA) and OIOS. Preliminary exploration is being undertaken for linking programmatic aspects in IMDIS to the existing financial and budgetary systems in the Secretariat and achieving greater precision and comparability of the logical framework components. The Inspectors were informed, however, that it is "too ambitious" to speak about linking human resources and programmatic aspects at this stage. Indeed, the Office of Human Resources Management is not involved in the ongoing enhancement efforts for IMDIS, and it is not clear whether the human resources management systems currently in place can be effectively linked with IMDIS in the future. OIOS officials cited the shortage of resources and expertise as the main restraining factor to achieving progress in this area.

60. Obviously, there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach in deciding to develop a performance monitoring information system in the UN organizations (or other organizations for that matter). A major determinant, though, in making such a fundamental decision is the return on investment expected from a selected approach in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the organization in managing its operations and meeting its goals versus the cost involved in developing the system.[40]

Box 19: ERP systems; pro and con

An ERP system provides a single comprehensive worldwide database collecting data from transactions processed in multiple modular applications supporting all aspects of the organization's activities. It simplifies data integration and provides a streamlined way to get data to various divisions, departments and stakeholders.

An ERP system is costly. The IRIS budget at ILO so far is close to US$30 million, and the cost of the GMS of WHO is estimated at US$55 million. On the other hand, the PIRES external costs at FAO were estimated at merely US$700,000 at the end of 2003.[41]

A private company that opted for an ERP approach has trimmed its transactional activity by 60 per cent and slashed HR administrative staff by about 55 per cent. Its annual savings were estimated to exceed US$800,000 (on annual sales of US$1 billion).[42]

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[39] Project brief, IMDIS version 3.0, final draft, 17 October 2003.
[40] For an informative and interesting brief comparison between ERP versus software-based systems, see "ERP Versus Best of Breed", Samuel Greengard, Workforce Management, November 2003, pp. 53-56.
[41] ILO GB.288/PFA/6, WHO A56/6, and FAO PIRES "Project Overview and Charter".
[42] Op. Cit., supra note 40.

Box 20: Software strategies; pro and con

A performance monitoring system based on a well-conceived software strategy could provide greater flexibility and improved interfacing ability between various systems with considerably lower costs.

An unfocused software strategy could prove costly over time and poses challenges of tying together disparate systems and ensuring long-term service and support.

61. An important consideration also to bear in mind while developing an effective performance monitoring system is the need to simplify. Lessons learned from some national experiences suggest that over-complexity of the performance measurement and data collection is the biggest risk factor threatening successful implementation of RBM. Consequently, the initial use of relatively few results statements and performance indicators facilitates effective measurement and tracking, and encourages stakeholders to embrace the system.[43]

Box 21: Simplify performance measurement; IRIS at ILO

In developing IRIS, ILO selected its indicators at the outcomes level. This is intended to simplify performance measurement while aiming to measure the impact of its work, raise the level of accountability, and avoid being absorbed by too many indicators related to its outputs. Generally, two indicators were defined for each of approximately 50 outcomes.

62. Related to this issue is the need to identify some standard or key indicators to measure performance at the organizational level. UNICEF developed a set of management indicators that were tested at country offices during 2003. The UN system organizations may also benefit in this regard from the experience of some national development agencies to develop standard outcome indicators for common "programme approaches" (groupings of similar projects).[44] In this context, the CEB, through its High Level Committees on Programme and Management, could explore the possibility of identifying key or standard performance indicators at the level of the UN system.

Box 22: Identify key performance indicators; the KIMRS at the UN

The United Nations developed the Key Item Management Reporting System (KIMRS) to provide analytical information on key performance indicators. Four clusters of management performance indicators have been developed and provide information on compliance (or divergence) with established goals. The system uses color-coded indicators, updated daily on the Intranet, to highlight where management actions need to be taken. For instance, a red indicator light on recruitment tracking clearly alerts the manager to delays in the recruitment process.[45]

63. Finally, it is important to recall that any performance information system can only be as good as the quality of information it receives and, therefore, can provide. To be effective, a performance information system needs to be supported by a reliable telecommunications infrastructure and a commitment by managers and staff concerned to supply it constantly with

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[43] Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), "Lessons Learned from Implementing Results-based Management in CIDA", June 1998.
[44] See supra note 2, pp. 99-101.
[45] http://intranet.un.org/MPO

the required data and information. For example, despite the fact that it is a well-conceived system, the effectiveness of SISTER at UNESCO is being hampered by connectivity problems and the uneven completion of the required information by programme officers and managers. To address part of these problems, the Director-General has instituted as a house-wide policy that all information required in SISTER must be completed in a comprehensive manner (providing satisfactory information on strategies to be pursued, expected results and performance indicators, and financial requirements and budgetary breakdowns) by programme officers and managers at all levels, lest budgetary allocations will be blocked. A functional and technical study to decrease connectivity problems has also been carried out.

Box 23: Improved telecommunications is important

To support IRIS (and set the foundation for a worldwide knowledge sharing), ILO is implementing a global telecommunications infrastructure project at an estimated cost of US$3 million.[46]

Benchmark 6

An effective performance monitoring system is in place

G. Effective use of evaluation findings through timely feedback and reporting

64. Evaluation aims to determine relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of programmes and activities in relationship to their goals and objectives.[47] Through a systematic analytical exercise, it attempts to gauge the extent of success in achieving the objectives, assess the underlying reasons for achievement or non-achievement, and identify key lessons learned and recommendations to improve performance.[48] Evaluations can be conducted occasionally or on selective basis.

65. Evaluation at the UN organizations is usually conducted at three levels: project, programme (individual or country programmes), and organizational levels. In terms of their scope, two types of evaluation can be generally identified in the UN system: in-depth evaluations, mainly conducted at the programme level; and thematic evaluations, usually related to policies, strategies, or cross-cutting topics having a bearing on the performance of the organization or several of its programmes. In terms of their authors, three types could be identified: self-evaluations, conducted by or under the auspices of the managers for their own projects/programmes; internal evaluations, conducted by or under the auspices of the internal oversight or evaluation services of the organization; and external evaluations, conducted by the external oversight bodies of the UN system, or by external consultants at explicit requests of the competent intergovernmental bodies.

66. The Inspectors have observed that, in general, there is a lack of coherence in the planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation cycle in many organizations, in particular in the final stage of evaluation, which is not systematically used on the eve of the next budgetary cycle. A few organizations have recently begun to introduce "real-time" evaluations, which differ from traditional "ex-post" evaluations in that the evaluation takes place during the implementation of operations.[49] The aim is to adjust the course/process of

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[46] ILO, GB.286/PFA/6/2, March 2003.

[47] JIU report JIU/REP/98/2 on "More Coherence for Enhanced Oversight in the United Nations System", p.7.

[48] Adapted from the proposed harmonized terminology of the United Nations Development Group on RBM, June 2003, http://www.undg.org/documents/2485-Results-Based_Management_Terminology_-_Final_version.doc

[49] Real-time evaluation was introduced by the World Bank in 1996, UNHCR in 2000 and WFP in 2002 (WFP/EB.2/2004/2-B).

implementation with valid performance information, in light of the objectives (expected results), and to enhance the quality of current and future operations with real-time feedback. While this may be a promising instrument for real-time performance and for institutional learning, in general the effectiveness of the evaluation function at the UN organizations needs to be enhanced considerably for a successful implementation of RBM, and in particular in relation to the following aspects.

67. Introducing and enhancing self-evaluation has proved to be a major challenge for most organizations of the UN system. In some cases, this is due to a genuine lack of resources available to programme managers to conduct such evaluations from within their existing resources. However, in most cases, the lack of a self-evaluation culture at the organization and a limited backstopping and follow-up from the central evaluation services lead many managers to be lax in allocating resources specifically to conduct self-evaluation using in-house or external expertise for that matter. At the United Nations, for example, the cost of self-evaluation is not separately presented or allocated in the regular budget and the adequate level of staff time and other resources has never been assessed. The departments expressed the need for more assistance from OIOS in providing guidance to self-evaluations and facilitating the sharing of evaluation practices among departments and offices.[50]

Box 24: Self-evaluation is key to an effective evaluation system; the case of FAO

At the end of 2001, the Director-General of FAO elaborated, through a bulletin,[51] the elements of a strengthened evaluation system for the organization. Auto-evaluation (i.e. self-evaluation) was emphasized as a main component of the system. It was required for all technical projects prior to the end of their planned implementation, and at least once during the six-year timeframe of the MTP for other programme entities. All auto-evaluation actions were to be planned into the programme design, including their timing and costs. Auto-evaluation is to be implemented in line with guidelines issued by the Evaluation Service in November 2003.[52]

68. Given the fact that the central evaluation services at most UN organizations, due to their own limited resources,[53] are usually unable to conduct more than two or three evaluations per year (in-depth and/or thematic), many years could pass before certain programmes are subject to a central evaluation (e.g. the periodicity of in-depth evaluation for any given programme at the United Nations follows a 10 to 12 year cycle).[54] Hence, self-evaluation should constitute the backbone of any effective evaluation system in order to provide timely analysis of the performance of projects and programmes.

69. Another major challenge for effective evaluation systems at the UN organizations is the use of the evaluation findings and recommendations. The expressed purpose of evaluation is to improve the performance of the evaluated entity. This could only be achieved through an effective use of the evaluation findings and recommendations to influence upcoming and future decision-making, and the lessons learned from the evaluations should be applied in future programme planning. Indeed, the Inspectors caution against terminating some programmes or substituting others before a full evaluation of the programmes to be terminated or replaced, including the identification of weaknesses and lessons learned in their implementation. Mechanisms should be put in place for the implementation, monitoring and follow-up to the findings and recommendations of evaluations. In a majority of the

[50] "Strengthening the role of evaluation findings in programme design, delivery and policy directives", Note by the Secretary-General, A/57/68 of 23 April 2002, paras. 10 and 23.
[51] FAO, DGB No. 2001/33 dated 5 November 2001.
[52] See www.fao.org/pbe
[53] See, for example, supra note 50, para. 9.
[54] Ibid., para. 31.

programmes at the United Nations, for example, comprehensive assessments of whether findings have been acted upon effectively appear to be the exception, rather than the rule.[55]

70. Improving this aspect is closely linked to timely reporting to senior management and the competent intergovernmental bodies. Part of this challenge could be met through the establishment of effective performance monitoring systems, as highlighted above. Those systems should provide a valuable amount of data and information needed for effective and timely evaluation. However, an important part of this challenge could only be met through improved evaluation plans, including self-evaluation plans, aligned with the programme planning cycles of the organization and with the timetable of the envisaged review by the competent intergovernmental bodies.

71. Improved evaluation plans become more pressing in view of the fact that, in most UN organizations, evaluations of programmes falling within a specific area of activity are supposed to be reviewed by the relevant specialized intergovernmental body before their review by the expert body in charge of overall oversight on the programmatic aspects of the organization.[56] This disposition was never implemented at the United Nations, for example, since 1994.[57] In another example, UNDP develops its evaluation plan for five years (the last one covers the period 2002-2006). However, this plan is not aligned with MYFF, which is developed for four years, the last of which for 2004-2007.

72. Finally, there is a need to establish sharing mechanisms for the findings and lessons learned from the various evaluations, or enhance the existing ones and their use. Several organizations have established central evaluation databases to support organizational learning and improve performance. For example, in 2001, the Evaluation Office at UNICEF created a real-time, on-line Intranet access to an evaluation and research database intended to record the organization's memory on performance, findings and lessons learned. It allows users, particularly from UNICEF field offices, to access abstracts and full reports of evaluations and studies conducted by UNICEF and other organizations. It also serves as a reference source on methodological tools.

73. Such mechanisms, though, need to be themselves evaluated over a certain time to assess their impact on improving performance, in particular in terms of feedback to future project/programme planning and evaluation plans. For example, a review conducted of the UNICEF database in 2000 revealed that despite the long history of the evaluation database (test version of which first released in 1993), it was not as widely known or used in the organization as had been expected.[58]

Box 25: Evaluation databases are important learning mechanisms

UNDP maintains its Central Evaluation Database (CEDAB) as the institutional memory on lessons learned from programmes and projects that have been evaluated. It is mandatory for evaluators to submit, along with the evaluation reports, a Project Evaluation Information Sheet (PEIS) containing information to be entered into the database.

Benchmark 7

Evaluation findings are used effectively

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[55] Supra note 50, para. 37.
[56] See, for example, rules 107.2 (c) (ii) and 107.4 (f) of the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning at the United Nations.
[57] Supra note 50, para. 28.
[58] UNICEF, E/ICEF/2000/8 (Part I).

H. Internalization of the results-based approach within the organization

74. Internalizing results-based management, that is ensuring that management and staff, at all levels of the organization, are fully familiar with its concepts and conscious of its requirements in relation to their own work, was emphasized as a major challenge to the effective implementation of RBM by many officials interviewed. The questionnaire referred to in the introduction to this report would have provided, inter alia, valuable information on the level of success of each organization in internalizing the RBM system. In the absence of such data, the Inspectors would nevertheless like to highlight the following points based on their review of the experience of the UN organizations and the efforts of some to internalize the process.

75. Most organizations that made a systematic breakthrough in implementing RBM relied on, at the beginning of the process, to institutionalized structures with clear responsibilities to oversee the orderly and clearly conceptualized introduction of RBM in the organization. Hence, at UNDP, a steering committee (comprising the Bureau of Management, the Operations Support Group and the Evaluation Office) had the responsibility of ensuring a coherent approach for the introduction of RBM, including the preparation of the first MYFF (2000-2003). At WFP, the Executive Director, in order to give impetus to the implementation process of RBM and ensure harmonization and coherence in the process, established a new Division for RBM in 2003, which reports directly to him.

76. Similarly, at UNFPA, in 1999 a new office for RBM attached to the Executive Director's Office was established. This Office is responsible to coordinate the introduction of RBM throughout the organization and the formulation of the MYFF. These structures proved most useful in introducing RBM to the organizations and are consistent with similar experiences of national agencies.[59] Once RBM takes root and is streamlined throughout the organization, the role of such top-down authorities in guiding the process can be expected to diminish.

77. Training is another vital element for the successful internalization of RBM. Most organizations do realize its importance, and are at various stages of the process of elaborating or adapting their training and orientation tools and materials to RBM requirements. WHO, for example, developed a series of interactive CDs on results-based management and training courses which were presented in each of the six WHO regions and at Headquarters. ILO is currently in the process of elaborating a training manual. Several training kits exist already at UNICEF, UNDP and UNFPA.

78. While some organizations offer training on RBM mainly for staff in the area of programme planning and finance, the Inspectors stress the need to promote change management throughout the organization, and therefore, induction workshops and training on RBM should include staff at all levels that are responsible for programme implementation.

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[59] For example, the creation in the mid nineties of a dedicated RBM Unit located within the Performance Review Branch in CIDA helped to provide a more focused corporate approach to RBM in the agency and to re-enforce its decision to adopt RBM as its main management tool. See "Results-Based Management in CIDA: An Introductory Guide to the Concepts and Principles", Performance Review Branch, January 1999.

Box 26: Training at all levels is essential

At UNDP, training kits are prepared at all levels, and web-based support training is updated each year. UNDP provides year-round face-to-face and web-based training on managing for development results. Face-to-face training is provided to entry-level professionals and senior country office managers. Web-based training to professionals is entering its third year and variations of the RBM course are being developed for all staff members for baseline learning, as well as for experts.

At UNFPA, to increase staff awareness with RBM and its impact and requirements on their work, an induction process, including through a series of workshops, is carried out at headquarters and the field. This process was launched after learning and human resources strategies for the organization were developed.

UNESCO has allocated funds from its corporate training budget to provide for a systematic training of programme officers at Headquarters and in field offices in results formulation related to RBM and work plan management. In the first half of 2004, an RBM pilot training programme was implemented through hands-on workshops, frequently individualized to meet specific office needs and circumstances in different geographic locations. An RBM Training Plan of Action for 2004-2005 has been developed for UNESCO as a whole.

79. The Inspectors would like to emphasize, though, that while the elaboration and provision of training tools and kits are essential, verifying and ensuring periodically their use and application at all levels in the organization is equally essential for a successful internalization process. Several officials interviewed also emphasized the value of "on-the-job" training in relation to RBM requirements.

80. Finally, reviewing and adapting the regulations and rules governing the various work and management aspects of the organization is important to institutionalize RBM in the organization. Programming manuals or guidelines need to reflect the results-based approach, and the financial regulations and rules need to be adapted to the flexibility and accountability requirements offered by an RBM system.

Benchmark 8

RBM is effectively internalized throughout the organization

I. A Knowledge Management strategy to support RBM

81. There is a growing awareness among the organizations about the need for embracing knowledge management as a key management support tool, which can be used to reinforce and complement RBM since both have the ultimate goal of making organizations more effective, thus improving their performance. Organizations could successfully implement RBM without the need to put in place a KM strategy or vice versa, although the Inspectors are of the view that concerted implementation of both concepts will be mutually reinforcing. As RBM and KM rely on adequate information management systems, organizations planning to implement KM and RBM need to develop a long term IT strategy which contemplates the existing synergies between the two concepts. Additionally, in both cases the most important obstacle to overcome is organizational culture. Changes in the culture of a given organization do not happen overnight; it is a lengthy process, which requires among other things extensive

and appropriate training. Those organizations planning to promote cultural change should consider how to benefit from a parallel implementation of both concepts, avoiding unnecessary and in some cases duplicative costs.

82. KM strategies should put emphasis on how knowledge is used in order to efficiently achieve the respective organizations' objectives, stressing the links and synergies between the concepts of RBM and KM, in respect of the need to develop a right organizational culture as well as the need to establish solid knowledge sharing mechanisms to obtain a full benefit from the lessons learnt (positive and negative), as one of the key elements of any RBM approach.

83. Knowledge management (KM), as a concept, is relatively new and encompasses diverse fields. There is no agreed definition of KM, even among practitioners. In the context of this report, the term could be defined as the systematic process of identifying, capturing and sharing knowledge people can use to improve performance. Some of the organizations that have adopted KM call themselves "learning organizations". UNDP pioneers this concept within the United Nations system and has devoted a lot of attention to its implementation. The World Bank has extensively used this tool in its operations and has positioned itself as "the knowledge bank".

84. The first step for an organization, based on its mission and related mandates as well as acquired experience, is to identify the amount, type and structure of the required knowledge and competencies it needs such as technical knowledge, IT, etc. In this process, the organization should find out what are the knowledge and information needs of its stakeholders in addition to the needs for internal management.

85. A main challenge for the organizations is to avoid losing the knowledge gained by individual officials and staff in general, thus risking losses in the organizations' institutional memories. Some organizations of the private sector, for instance, pay their top managers at the end of their careers for a 'debriefing'. Therefore, a paramount task for staff at all levels is to record and report on innovations, best practices, etc. Moreover, innovations bringing efficiency gains and/or savings should be not only encouraged but also recorded in the individual performance appraisal reports and properly rewarded.

86. A successful implementation of RBM requires that the organizations be equipped with matching management information systems able to facilitate knowledge sharing.

87. Since knowledge can be explicit (data, manuals, regulations and rules, procedures, etc) or implicit/tacit (unwritten knowledge largely untapped), it is crucial for the organizations to establish a clear and structured knowledge management strategy which enables them to capture, collate, codify, and structure the knowledge, as a pre-requisite for its sharing and dissemination both internally and externally.

88. Knowledge is a valuable asset and a source of power for decision-making, thus investment in this area, if well planned, is cost-effective. Knowledge management is a valuable tool to reduce costs; improve processes; approach problems by using systematic methods, basing the decisions on data and not on hypothesis, using solid tools to treat data and arrive at conclusions; learning from internal and external present and past experiences (no reinvent the wheel) and identify the best practices. This fact has led some organizations to establish specific units to deal with knowledge management.

89. This report does not pretend to extensively discuss this issue but to highlight that for United Nations organizations to be more efficient, cost-effective and competitive in a RBM environment, knowledge management can be an additional tool that facilitates achievement of results through the development of a genuine knowledge sharing culture thus making the

organizations "learning" or "intelligent" ones. The Joint Inspection Unit plans to further study KM activities in United Nations system organizations in the future.

Box 27: Knowledge management is a key management support tool

UNDP has developed a knowledge management strategy and devoted a lot of attention to its implementation. The World Bank has extensively used knowledge management in its operations. Both have become "learning organizations".

The 2004-2007 Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF) prepared by UNDP is a good example of the way an organization learns from past performance. The MYFF was developed over an 18-month period in which various aspects of performance during the period of 2000-2003 were systematically analysed at all levels, while the external environment and projected country demand for 2004-2007 were considered prior to the framework's finalization and approval by the Executive Board. Based on this institutional learning, the new MYFF is now viewed by UNDP as the organization's main policy instrument and reference for strategic management.

Benchmark 9

A Knowledge Management strategy is developed to support RBM

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The 2004 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations[1] requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on progress made in the implementation of the recommendations contained therein. The present report describes the dramatic increase in demands for United Nations peacekeeping over the past year and in that context highlights areas in which progress is being made and continued progress is needed, focusing in particular on resource generation and rapid deployment requirements, operational demands in implementing complex mandates and linkages with regional and subregional organizations. It invites the Special Committee to consider a number of new proposals, including strategic reserves and standing police capacities, that would help fill ongoing gaps in United Nations peacekeeping capabilities.

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I. Introduction

1. In the past four years, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretariat have worked concertedly to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping, implementing the reforms emanating from the Brahimi report (see A/55/305-S/2000/809) and the subsequent sessions of the Special Committee. Even as this work is ongoing, it is clear that the reform efforts have produced a strengthened Department of Peacekeeping Operations with important new capabilities.

2. It is also clear that the demands on peacekeeping and related field operations are growing and changing dramatically, reaching an unprecedented scale and degree of complexity. Over the past year four complex operations were either newly mandated and deployed or significantly expanded — in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This surge amplified a trend already under way in 2002 and 2003. The total number of uniformed personnel now stands at approximately 62,800, up from 51,600 in March 2004, and civilian personnel at over 11,000, deployed in 17 peacekeeping and related field operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

3. The surge in demand is a welcome sign of increased opportunities to advance the cause of peace in many areas, but the scale and complexity of the new operations is stretching the capacities of the international community as a whole, and we cannot expect any diminishment of demand. On the contrary, we will likely face a new mission in the Sudan and a possible expansion of United Nations operations in Iraq in the coming year.

4. These developments raise a number of important questions. First, can the United Nations meet the simultaneous demands of planning, deploying, supporting and managing operations on this scale, or indeed, should it? Pressures on a stretched system were mitigated somewhat by the support of Member States and by new mechanisms and resources that four years of reform provided, not least the increased planning and support staff available at Headquarters. However, the assumptions underpinning those reforms have been outstripped by realities. The strategic deployment stocks, for example, were configured to support the rapid deployment of just one complex operation of 10,000 uniformed personnel. That so much has been achieved is remarkable, but this level of operational activity is not easily managed or sustained, or necessarily within the system's limits. Perhaps the time has come to consider the basic policy question of how many complex missions the United Nations should manage at once, lest overextension lead to failure.

5. A second, related, question is whether the necessary resources can be generated and deployed rapidly enough to support United Nations peacekeeping operations. Recent experience has shown that with capacities such as pre-mandate commitment authority and strategic deployment stocks in place, early planning and deployment capacity has improved; but gaps remain, including in the generation of civilian and uniformed personnel and in niche and enabling capabilities. These gaps must be addressed, and the present report outlines two important new proposals, for strategic reserves and a standing police capacity, that would help.

6. The complexity of United Nations operations is also creating demands for further integration across the United Nations system and beyond. The fundamental security tasks of peacekeeping operations remain the foundation for many complex mandates, but success depends on concurrent progress along multiple tracks of the

mandate, including, inter alia, political, humanitarian, development and human rights tasks. The majority of operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations today have mandates that extend beyond the security-related tasks traditionally linked to the term peacekeeping, and, indeed, they might more accurately be termed peace operations. In some cases, such as those of the United Nations operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, critical security-related tasks are carried out by other organizations. That the terms peacekeeping, peace support and peace operations are synonymous to some and different to others is indicative of the complexity that has come to characterize the field. The time may very well be upon us to discuss seriously this terminology. This is not a merely semantic matter. A common understanding would further promote common approaches and cooperation between the various actors engaged in the tasks of complex peacekeeping operations today.

7. The Special Committee has underscored the need for common approaches and comprehensive strategies linking post-conflict peacebuilding and development support in the transition from conflict to peace. We have learned some lessons on the design of integrated missions; where appropriate, we are developing templates, but each operation is to a great extent sui generis, facing unique challenges, with different mandates and resources. We must be prepared with early analysis and integrated planning to deploy operations based on complementarity, flexibility and clear divisions of labour. There has been progress towards clarifying system-wide United Nations approaches in some key areas, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the rule of law. More progress is required in others, such as security-sector reform. Implementing complex peacekeeping mandates requires further integration at various levels, in planning and managing operations at the Headquarters level, and operational integration on the ground to link the mission, the United Nations country team and other partners.

8. Globally, peacekeeping demands today outstrip the capacities of any one organization, and it is vital to continue to build up the operational linkages between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations whose services will also be called upon. We must further define how the United Nations and other organizations should work together and how peacekeeping demands should be shared. In some cases, United Nations peacekeeping will simply be the wrong tool, and it is vital that we recognize when this is so. It remains appropriate for situations where there is a viable peace agreement, supported by the consent of the parties. Where robust United Nations peacekeeping is required, it is to deter relatively isolated spoilers who would use force to derail a peace process that otherwise enjoys wide support. Situations where United Nations peacekeeping is not appropriate, such as those that call for stability operations in non-permissive environments, will no doubt arise. For these, capabilities exist in some regional organizations, but not all. Even where conditions for United Nations peacekeeping exist, the burden is increasingly shared with regional and subregional organizations. The United Nations may in some cases deploy to take over their operations, in others hand over to them or work side by side with them. The right combination will vary depending upon circumstances, including the political will of the Member States, as well as the capacities and mandates of the organizations concerned. The aim must be to develop a system of international capacities that is complementary, flexible and nimble.

9. Efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capacity are ongoing, and the United Nations is committed to assisting in this regard, recognizing the importance of

regional solutions to Africa's challenges. However, the logistical, financial and operational support necessary for multiple, extended operations will take some time to put in place. To shift the burden of peacekeeping precipitously onto African organizations would be both unfair to them and a disservice to the people caught in conflict and in need of peacekeeping support. Furthermore, peacekeeping is most successful when it is an expression of truly international commitment to peace and security. One aim of enhancing African peacekeeping capacities must be for African peacekeepers to serve in operations outside Africa, and for other regions, including developed countries, to be represented among peacekeepers in Africa.

10. The United Nations must move forward on three simultaneous fronts to face the broad and wide-ranging challenges that remain before us: first, we must bolster the capacity to prepare for operations, rapidly generating and deploying the right resources; second, we must improve the integration of peace support efforts at various levels; and, third, we must build flexible operational linkages with regional and subregional organizations and, where appropriate, assist in building their capacities.

11. These issues are at the heart of many of the Committee's recommendations, related as they are to resource generation, rapid deployment and the comprehensive strategies required for the conduct of complex operations. The present report, therefore, focuses in particular on recommendations in these critical areas that merit special attention in the context of the surge in peacekeeping. While it does not cover every single point raised by the Committee, I wish to reassure Committee members that other matters will be addressed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the context of the Committee's meetings.

II. Preparing missions for success: resource generation and rapid deployment

12. As the Special Committee has noted, the early success of peacekeeping operations continues to depend to a significant degree on the ability to raise the necessary personnel, uniformed and civilian, and deploy them rapidly. Rapid deployment mechanisms, such as the pre-mandate commitment authority and strategic deployment stocks, have strengthened United Nations capacity to provide logistical support to personnel deployments. The recent force generation experience has also been encouraging, thanks to the many Member States that have contributed to this effort. However, key gaps remain. A capability to respond to threats rapidly is required. For police mandates, technical expertise in planning and establishing police development programmes is needed early on, yet current standby arrangements have not provided such expertise as and when needed. Difficulties also remain in the resourcing of niche capabilities and enabling units. Strategic lift options are also limited. Progress in resolving these limitations will better prepare our missions to fulfil their mandates effectively.

A. Strategic reserves

13. Sound and prudent military planning calls for any complex military operation to have, on call, a reserve or reaction capability able to respond to crisis. Yet United Nations peacekeeping operations are often deployed without this requirement, either

because the mission troop ceilings do not allow for a reserve or because the capability is unavailable, or both. As the challenges facing peacekeeping mount, so does the potential for failure, and the inherent cost, should a mission be unable to manage a crisis effectively. It is essential that we be better able to respond to the sorts of situation that faced the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 2003 (Ituri) and 2004 (Bukavu). Without a reserve, missions have few ready options to respond to dangerously unfolding circumstances. Whether the response is diverting existing mission forces and resources to try to deal with the crisis, generating fresh forces or appealing for military assistance outside the United Nations force, each has its shortcomings. The first risks an ever increasing spiral of "mission creep" and diversion from existing mandate requirements with resulting losses in time and costs, the second takes too long, and the third comes with no guarantee of a positive response.

14. In its 2004 report[1] the Special Committee welcomed further study and proposals of the Secretariat with respect to rapidly deployable reserve forces. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has also underscored the importance of a reserve capacity for United Nations peacekeeping (see A/59/565 and Corr.1, para. 219). Several options for drawing on a reliable reserve have been examined, including deploying forces from other United Nations missions, reinforcing existing troop contingents or finding new ones, defining conditional arrangements with Member States or regional organizations, and establishing forces specifically for this purpose. In all but the last option there are significant penalties, either in terms of time, implications for other missions redeploying their troops or uncertain availability.

15. A strategic reserve for United Nations peacekeeping is therefore proposed. As currently envisaged, it would be divided into a number of task forces of some 1,250 troops each. Each task force would be held within the national command of a troop contributor and would be a combined-arms force, with enabling units, capable of sustained operations. The task forces would ideally be drawn from a geographical range of troop-contributing countries, each of which would secure prior political and legislative agreement to deploy its forces to predetermined missions, obviating the often time-consuming process of securing such agreement immediately prior to deployment. If achieved, this aspect of reliability would represent a significant advance.

16. The task forces would be configured in a structure of "graduated readiness", with the lead elements held at highest readiness and other elements ready at longer notice, enabling a graduated response to a crisis or crises. Once deployed, the forces would come under command of the Force Commander. The strategic reserve would deploy for a specific duration and tasks and return to the troop-contributing country upon their completion. Its tasks would focus on stabilization but could also include others, such as providing an interim capability pending deployment of other forces or surge manning for a specific event such as elections.

17. A reserve shared among missions would make good use of the limited supply of capable forces and would also send a deterrent signal to potential "spoilers". Besides its operational capabilities, a strategic reserve could provide significant cost efficiencies.

18. I urge Member States to give every consideration to this concept, which meets an existing requirement and is envisaged as complementary to other, similar capabilities available to the international community. Not all eventualities would be met by a reserve of this nature, and, certainly, circumstances can be foreseen for which a multinational force or other arrangement would be required. It will need to be discussed and developed further in consultation with Member States, including with respect to financial implications, strategic lift requirements and other aspects.

B. Standing civilian police capacity

19. United Nations police personnel have gone from a total of 4,476 in December 2003 to 6,772 in 12 missions in December 2004. The generation of police officers with specialized skills, including a working knowledge of French, has been particularly challenging. Mandated tasks set for police require personnel able to help build sustainable police structures, to link police activity to broader rule-of-law strategies and to transfer technical expertise in a range of skills. They call for highly qualified police officers and civilians — experts in such areas as police policy and planning, operations, law and procedures, administration, budgets, personnel and logistics, intelligence and investigations.

20. Expertise in these areas is an ongoing requirement in United Nations missions assisting security-sector reform and the re-establishment of the rule of law, yet this requirement is often unmet, as officers currently deployed to peacekeeping operations, although possessing good operational skills, do not commonly have such expertise. The Brahimi report proposed a standby arrangement to meet this need, but the results of the 100-person on-call roster have been mixed. Political clearance at the national level can slow deployment. Additional efforts are under way to identify, select and train qualified police officers for rapid deployment through training programmes, the database of selection assistance teams and country visits, but the standby arrangements remain unreliable. In paragraph 223 of its report, the High-level Panel also identified this gap and recommended that such a police capacity be made reliably available to the United Nations.

21. There is therefore a need to shift to a standing capacity of police, employed professionally for two to three years, to provide this expertise. Such a capacity exists at Headquarters, but a similar one is needed for missions. A small group of up to 100 police is proposed to deploy in teams of 10 to 20 in mission areas to support early planning and needs assessments, build up mission headquarters and set up a well-functioning civilian police component, and to articulate and implement programmes to develop sustainable local police structures, as well as to conduct periodic evaluations related to mandate implementation. The personnel of the standing capacity would predominantly serve in missions and also engage in developing guidelines, training materials and integrated rule-of-law strategies. Standing-body personnel would have extensive backgrounds in police planning and development, as well as leadership and managerial qualities. If approved, the capacity would be piloted with a first tranche of 20 officers, to allow for a review of the concept before proceeding to establish the full capacity. Police officers and some civilian experts would be drawn from a cross section of Member States, providing the United Nations with readily available, skilled, trained police cognizant of local legal culture, history and police practices. They would be trained in transferring

their skills both to the mandated United Nations civilian police elements and to local police and regional organizations.

22. The concept will need to be discussed and developed further in consultation and partnership with Member States, including with respect to financial implications. I urge Member States to give the concept their full consideration.

C. Force generation, United Nations Standby Arrangements System and rapidly deployable headquarters

23. The massive force-generation exercise of the past year has been accompanied by increased efforts on the part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to engage with new and potential contributors of military observers, civilian police and troops. Since October 2003, 11 new contributor countries have come on board, and a number of existing ones have dramatically increased contributions.

24. There remains a need to increase the presence of women among military and civilian police personnel. As of June 2004, women represented 1 per cent of military personnel and 5 per cent of civilian police personnel assigned by Member States to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

25. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has developed policy guidelines on reconnaissance visits to ensure that troop contributions are ready in time for rapid deployment. In line with these guidelines, the Department undertakes early liaison with potential troop-contributing countries so as to gauge interest in pending missions and to brief on and clarify all issues related to likely operational plans and force requirements; consultations continue throughout the planning and force-generation processes.

26. The United Nations Standby Arrangements System has supported the surge in peacekeeping and the deployment of operational troops in a more rapid manner than previously possible. The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), for example, was set up in 116 days. The on-call list element of the Standby Arrangements System has been used to generate the Force Headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), ONUB and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Member States were invited to provide rapidly deployable staff officers and military observers to make up the integrated force headquarters and military observer groups. The structure of the generic mission headquarters on-call list has been revised and upgraded, with new posts and job descriptions.

D. Materiel readiness and reimbursement

27. With a gap between the troops available and the materiel required, it remains important for those with resources to assist those ready to serve. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to facilitate bilateral and other arrangements to overcome major equipment and self-sustainment shortfalls faced by troop-contributing countries. In UNOCI, to give just one example, separate memorandums of understanding between the Organization and troop-contributing countries were arranged to provide major equipment and self-sustainment services to several re-hatted African contingents. The Department continues its efforts to ensure that the

contingent-owned equipment (COE) system and other mechanisms to overcome individual contributors' shortfalls are applied in a proactive and flexible way and will continue to facilitate efforts by contributors to assist one another.

28. Reimbursements for COE and troop costs are currently running on a four-month cycle. By mid-December 2004, claims will have been reimbursed for all units with signed memorandums of understanding for the period up to September 2004, subject to the availability of funds in the related missions' accounts. The Secretariat is reviewing and assessing possibilities to facilitate faster reimbursement to support rapid deployment by troop-contributing countries in the Standby Arrangements System.

29. The Secretariat presented a paper on a mechanism to provide guidance and decision-making on the COE system to the 2004 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment. In my report on the 2004 COE Working Group (A/59/292), I re-emphasized the need for a channel of consultation between the Secretariat and Member States to ensure that the COE system is dynamic and keeps pace with changes in the peacekeeping environment between the triennial meetings of the Working Group. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently developing several proposals for improving these procedures and would welcome the opportunity to brief and to seek the guidance of Member States as to their relative merit and priority.

E. Strategic lift, enabling and niche capabilities

30. The United Nations does not have strategic-lift units on standby to move troops and contingent-owned equipment to and from mission areas, nor does it have the lift capacity to promptly and effectively deploy a reserve force. This gap has previously been flagged by the Special Committee. Little progress has been made in reliably filling it, and the global bidding procedure takes a minimum of three to six weeks. In paragraph 217 of its report the High-level Panel recommended that Member States with airlift and sealift capabilities make them available to the United Nations on a negotiated fee-based structure.

31. Enabling units such as force headquarters companies, military police units, vertical and horizontal construction engineer companies, and level 2 and 3 hospitals are critical for the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces in the field, but they also remain in high demand in all militaries. With the notable exception of helicopters, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has successfully generated most enabling units for the upcoming year. The generation of such resources, however, is a time-consuming process that can stall the full deployment of a mission, and Member States are therefore urged to consider providing them early on.

32. Several Member States have approached the United Nations with offers to contribute resources to peace operations in discrete units staffed by government-provided civilians, to perform specialist functions such as medical support. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is exploring mechanisms to draw on such offers, including through applying COE procedures. Feedback and guidance from the Committee on this matter would be welcome.

F. Personnel

33. Recruiting and retaining qualified civilians for peacekeeping operations remain both primary objectives and particular challenges for the Organization. The number of international and local staff serving in peacekeeping missions has increased to 11,550, with an additional 2,400 yet to be deployed to meet staffing requirements posed by new and expanding missions. As operations have expanded in complexity, risk and hardship, the competition with other organizations for the most valuable expertise and relevant experience has grown in turn. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, together with the Office of Human Resources Management, is currently in active dialogue with Member States in addressing this and related issues (see A/59/291).

34. The human resources strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations broadly involves five main areas: (a) developing mission templates to ensure the presence of adequate skills and expertise; (b) direct outreach to Member States to increase awareness of qualified potential candidates; (c) refining appropriate contractual arrangements and fair and equitable conditions of service; (d) a strategic approach to training and career development; and (e) a meaningful performance appraisal system.

35. To support these areas, several planning tools are in development, including flexible, standardized mission templates, expanded generic job profiles and the identification of critical start-up lists for small, medium and large-scale missions. In addition, a number of recruitment mechanisms are facilitating the identification and selection of personnel while adhering to a competitive and transparent recruitment process. Galaxy is now the single web-based platform for advertising mission posts. The system feeds into an integrated application called Nucleus, which supports the processing of applicants and through which field managers can access vetted rosters of candidates. The experience of recent mission launches has compelled the Department to re-evaluate the rapid deployment roster concept with a view to articulating further recommendations to the General Assembly in a report due for publication in spring 2005.

G. Training

36. To augment the above-mentioned efforts to field high-calibre personnel, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a department-wide training policy that would coordinate specialized training, integrate the training of different categories of personnel and provide a comprehensive approach to the training and development of civilian field staff.

37. In line with recommendations of the Special Committee, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations successfully developed standardized generic training modules, level I, while the standardized training modules II (specialists) and III (senior mission management) are near finalization. The Department will continue to engage with national peacekeeping training centres and training focal points to facilitate standardization in pre-deployment training through the Training Recognition Project. The Department further facilitates the sponsoring of students from emerging troop-contributing countries to take part in national courses offered by troop-contributing countries with established peacekeeping training centres. To

support Member States' training initiatives, the Department continues to update and distribute a number of peacekeeping training publications, and there is an ongoing effort to translate these into all six United Nations languages.

H. Strategic deployment stocks and pre-mandate commitment authority

38. Pre-mandate commitment authority has provided early funding for the deployment of initial civilian and military personnel, transportation of strategic deployment stocks and the purchase of materiel and services. In all cases, it was used at or near the funding cap of $50 million per mission. Recent experience will be reviewed with the Controller's office, with a view to making proposals regarding existing mechanisms and financial ceilings.

39. The initial procurement of strategic deployment stocks is almost completed. The stocks have provided essential support for rapid deployment. In the light of experience, some adjustments have proved necessary. For example, procedures to expedite replenishment are being explored in consultation with the Department of Management, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is now focusing on improving the level of support from strategic deployment stocks to new missions, and developing the composition and availability of equipment and supplies in the stocks.

I. Cooperation with troop-contributing countries

40. In its 2004 report, the Special Committee placed emphasis on close cooperation and consultation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and troop-contributing countries. It is indeed vital that troop-contributing countries be fully apprised of mission requirements and new developments and that they be prepared to meet the demands of missions. The Department continues to hold weekly meetings with troop-contributing countries to update them on relevant events that have occurred in peacekeeping operations and to make its weekly briefing note on field operations available to them. Dedicated meetings have taken place at various stages for new or ongoing peacekeeping operations, including with regard to changes in or the renewal of mandates. In addition, the Department has markedly increased the number of briefings, meetings and selection assistance visits to Member States.

III. Implementation of complex, multidimensional mandates

41. In its 2004 report the Special Committee stressed the need for comprehensive strategies for complex peacekeeping operations and for strengthened cooperation and coordination among specialized agencies, funds and programmes within the United Nations system, as well as with the Bretton Woods institutions and the range of other actors engaged on the ground.

42. The need to put peacekeeping within an overall context of assistance for peacebuilding and longer-term development was also echoed in paragraph 224 of the High-level Panel's report. An overall strategy integrating peacekeeping,

peacebuilding and development approaches must be articulated through an integrated planning process at the Headquarters level and the coordination of backstopping and management support for the mission. At the mission level, the integration of the various components of the mission must be carried out by the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representatives. Missions must also create close partnerships with non-United Nations partners, integral to success in the transition to peace. Within each mission, the functional strategies articulated for each element of the mandate, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law, and security-sector reform must be implemented by a range of actors. Finally, at the level of administrative and logistical support, integration through the use of common services can provide efficiencies and cost savings.

43. Integration at various levels has progressed somewhat, particularly with regard to inter-agency policy development on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and the rule of law. In other areas, more work is required to resolve dilemmas arising from issues such as humanitarian space in the context of integrated operations, differing organizational cultures, rules and regulations, and disparities between sources of funding for different elements of integrated mandates.

44. The surge in the level of peacekeeping activity over the past year has strained the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to establish and effectively manage the operations currently under its direction. It should be recalled that the augmented staffing for the Department, which was authorized as part of the Brahimi process, was determined on the basis of the significantly lower level of activity pertaining at that time. It is the intention of the Department to seek some limited additional staff resources in the next peacekeeping support account budget cycle to provide effective operational backstopping to current missions in the context of the surge, and in some of the key substantive and thematic areas now common in complex operations.

A. Mission integration

45. Many of the attributes of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept and practices have been adapted and applied by mission planning groups. Full implementation of the IMTF concept as intended in the Brahimi report, however, remains a work in progress. Practical difficulties remain, such as the undetermined length of the planning process, the difficulty in getting staff seconded to the Task Force for extended periods and the competing demands on Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to focus on political negotiations while IMTF planning is under way.

46. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is refining and discussing with United Nations partners an integrated mission planning process, which could serve as a basis for a common, system-wide approach to integrated mission planning, applicable to any stage of United Nations engagement. A handbook of guidelines and a training course are currently under development, in consultation with partners, to facilitate the application of the process.

47. Also, in collaboration with the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Group, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has commissioned a study of integrated missions, expected to be

completed in March 2005, to draw the lessons of recent integrated operations and provide recommendations regarding the integration of United Nations entities in the context of peace operations.

B. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

48. Encouraging inter-agency work has been done on the integration of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration approaches across the United Nations system. In April 2004 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations initiated the establishment of an inter-agency working group to develop clear and usable policies, guidelines and procedures on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. With the involvement of several United Nations departments, funds and agencies, guidance is being drafted on some 30 areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, ranging from strategic principles to specific activities in a peacekeeping mission. The Department aims to conduct a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration simulation exercise in spring 2005 to test this first draft of the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards, which was discussed at an inter-agency workshop in October 2004, before rolling it out. In addition, the Department and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have started developing a web-based United Nations disarmament, demobilization and reintegration resource centre.

49. This collaboration with United Nations agencies has translated into better cooperation in the field. In Haiti and the Sudan, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP have integrated their staff resources in a single disarmament, demobilization and reintegration unit. This has promoted a holistic approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, developing strategies aimed at minimizing the gap between disarmament and demobilization on one hand and reintegration on the other. This effort will be expanded to include representatives of other United Nations agencies, with a view to applying this model to other peacekeeping missions.

50. However, more is required in order to achieve successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes that can truly help to lay the foundations for lasting peace in post-conflict countries. A key area remains early, adequate and sustainable funding to support the development and timely implementation of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategies.

C. Rule of law

51. In 2004 the Special Committee requested the Secretariat to provide an assessment of coordination with other parts of the United Nations system in the field of the rule of law. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations chairs a network of United Nations rule-of-law focal points and is taking a lead role in coordinating responses to many of the recommendations contained in my recent report on the rule of law (S/2004/616). The Department is also stressing the need to integrate rule-of-law approaches with other United Nations partners and to reach out more systematically to partners outside the system.

52. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations planned judicial and corrections components for seven peace operations, facilitated the deployment and start-up of rule-of-law components in five such missions and supported the ongoing policy dialogue with Member States. As a result, Security Council mandates now regularly include rule-of-law, judicial and corrections issues which are central to peace and security, while peacekeeping budgets provide better support for judicial and corrections matters.

53. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit recently briefed Member States on its work, collaboration and partnerships and critical human resources needs. Additional resources are needed to support our peacekeeping operations today, and this will not prejudice ongoing longer-term consideration of enhancing the rule-of-law capacities system-wide.

D. Security-sector reform

54. In paragraph 79 of its 2004 report the Special Committee encouraged the Secretariat to develop strategies based on lessons learned in the area of security-sector reform. In complex transitions out of conflict, key development objectives and structural stability cannot be achieved in the absence of security. Efforts to reform the security sector are critical for ensuring that security institutions can play an effective and legitimate role in providing external and internal security for citizens.

55. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing policies to engage more effectively in security-sector reform, particularly in providing relevant technical advice and advocacy in peacekeeping missions where it is mandated to assist, and when providing advice to negotiations as part of peacemaking. Where appropriate, the Department will also seek better engagement with partners that undertake this type of activity on a bilateral basis. Notwithstanding these efforts, further discussion is required to define the United Nations role in activities related to security-sector reform.

E. Mine action

56. Inter-agency coordination in mine action has also progressed and has been increasingly integrated into mission planning.

57. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action endorsed the Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid Response in November 2004, which provides, on the basis of voluntary funding, a standby mechanism for the rapid deployment of commercial survey and demining capacities that can be used to facilitate the start-up of new missions or provide a surge capacity in existing missions when the need arises.

58. Mine action expertise was included, where appropriate, during pre-deployment visits to troop-contributing countries. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing operating procedures with troop-contributing countries that are currently conducting demining operations in the field. This has been facilitated through the integration of mine-action coordination centres with force demining personnel and through the provision of assets to improve coordination, training and

operations in support of both force and mission requirements. The Information Management System for Mine Action is utilized in eight operations to support coordination, while the electronic mine information network (www.mineaction.org) has seen a drastic increase in usage worldwide.

F. Gender

59. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to make progress in implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), on women, peace and security. Gender expertise is now included in pre-mandate assessments and planning, and gender-adviser positions have been established in 10 peacekeeping missions, as well as at Headquarters. Gender advisers are supporting gender-mainstreaming activities in the different functional areas of missions, while also supporting capacity-building initiatives for counterparts within government and civil society in the host country. Gender units therefore need to be sufficiently staffed and resourced. The ongoing support of Member States is critical in this regard.

60. Mandatory pre-deployment gender training for military and civilian police personnel will build awareness of and sensitivity to gender issues and the human rights of women and girls, while also contributing to confidence-building between local populations and peacekeeping personnel. The Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations was launched in October 2004. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also issued a policy on human trafficking and has since been developing a package of training materials and guidance. A standard generic training module I and generic gender training modules are available to Member States from the Training and Evaluation Service. Member States are urged to use these materials in their national pre-deployment processes.

61. To ensure appropriate medical services for female troops and staff members in peacekeeping missions, at least one United Nations hospital in each mission should offer medical and reproductive-health services to female staff members and troops. Troop-contributing countries providing level 2 and above hospitals are urged to deploy female staff to those hospitals.

G. HIV/AIDS

62. All peacekeeping missions have either an HIV/AIDS policy adviser or a focal point, creating a proactive network across all operations. The deployment of the HIV/AIDS adviser in Haiti in advance of major troop deployments set a new precedent for peacekeeping operations, which has been repeated in the Sudan. Member States are urged to include HIV/AIDS peer educators in troop deployments.

63. The subject of HIV/AIDS is being mainstreamed into mission functions such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, through collaboration with relevant United Nations entities, non-governmental organizations and national AIDS programmes, with increasing outreach to host populations.

H. Common services

64. The integration of logistics and administrative services between United Nations entities in a mission area can provide for efficiencies and cost savings. Experience gained in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq has demonstrated that the mission and country team partners can share premises and other services. The planning effort for Iraq aims to further develop common services for the United Nations in the areas of transportation, communications and security, as a basis upon which to build a shared approach to meeting other common needs.

I. Regionalization: cooperation between peacekeeping operations

65. In 2004 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has pursued greater cooperation between peacekeeping operations in the same region. While United Nations rules and regulations are designed around individual missions and their budgets, cooperation between missions operating in the same region can create efficiencies through the sharing of logistics, equipment and administrative support. Questions with regard to budget oversight and responsibility, control over assets and logistical cooperation between missions remain.

66. In West Africa, arrangements were made between UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI to share limited logistics, materiel and administrative resources. With respect to military operations, UNAMSIL supported the pre-deployment training for United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and UNMIL personnel.

67. In the Great Lakes region, in the near future, MONUC and ONUB will share force enablers and maritime units to the extent possible, while letters of assist would include provisions for the use of assets on both sides of the border.

68. While missions adhere to their mandates and therefore focus on their own area of operation, some issues, such as cross-border movements of refugees and insurgents, require a regional level of attention. Among the many examples of the sharing of information and analysis between regional missions, UNMIL, UNOCI and UNAMSIL have developed information-sharing channels at the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and between functional staff on a range of issues. Regular meetings between Force Commanders, exchanges of liaison officers and regular exchanges of information between their joint mission assessment cells are taking place as well. The Force Commanders and Chief of Staff of United Nations missions in the Middle East also hold regular information-sharing meetings.

J. Lessons learned and implementation of best practices

69. The Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit continues to play an integral part in the development of peacekeeping guidance mechanisms and tools, as well as in the creation of lessons-learned reports and policy papers. In doing so, it has actively sought to cooperate with Member States, regional organizations and other United Nations entities. Results of the Unit's work have been posted on its web site (http://pbpu.unlb.org) throughout the year, and Member States have recently been briefed on the Unit's work in more detail.

70. The Unit is leading a Department-wide effort to develop operational and administrative guidance for all functional areas, with the aim of increasing efficiency and effectiveness and enhancing accountability. Related to this guidance project, the Unit is developing practical tools, such as after-action reports, for the field missions to capture and share best practices. The field network of best-practices officers, who are currently being recruited for Haiti, Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire, will be vital to the implementation of both efforts.

IV. Regional arrangements and enhancing African peacekeeping capacities

71. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has continued to develop relationships with regional and international organizations with the aim of increasing coordination and collaboration in the field of peacekeeping operations as well as enhancing African peacekeeping capacities. As stated above, the complexity of today's multidimensional peace operations demands that United Nations and regional arrangements explore complementary, flexible and nimble ways in which the unprecedented challenges of peace operations can be met. The international community should strive to build an interlocking system of capabilities able to respond to and deal with the range of demands related to peace operations.

A. Cooperation with regional arrangements

72. A number of positive initiatives are being developed to create strategic partnerships to meet the current peacekeeping challenges. Concepts being advanced by the European Union (EU) for battle groups and an informal clearing house to better facilitate the participation of EU members in United Nations peacekeeping are important examples. EU can also participate by contributing vital enabling units with niche capabilities, such as combat engineers, air-traffic support elements and close air support assets. Discussions are ongoing as to how these units could be deployed, and under what command and control arrangements.

73. Increasingly, forces from regional organizations are being deployed to respond quickly to fill the gap while the United Nations generates the forces necessary to deploy a peace operation. In the Sudan, the need for a small advance element was met by the Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade, which deployed at the request of the United Nations as part of the advance mission in the Sudan in June and July 2004.

74. In Burundi, in view of financial and logistics constraints, the African Union (AU) requested that its peacekeeping mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), be taken over by the United Nations. Following the establishment of ONUB on 1 June 2004, 2,641 AMIB troops and military observers were re-hatted. On that same day, MINUSTAH formally took over authority from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), and Chilean MIF forces were reassigned to MINUSTAH as United Nations peacekeepers. By 25 June, Canadian MIF troops were re-hatted as United Nations peacekeepers until the end of July 2004. To generate forces for MINUSTAH, the Secretariat worked closely with the Common Market of the South as well as with individual Central American troop-contributing countries.

75. In its 2004 report, the Special Committee encouraged the Secretariat to seek additional surge planning capacity from external sources on an objective and mission-oriented basis. Such standing military planning capabilities, however, are minimal in most regional organizations. With the aim of facilitating handover or takeover of military tasks between entities, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing guidelines for such situations in consultation with EU, AU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The United Nations will also explore possibilities for joint command post simulation exercises with partner organizations to increase interoperability.

B. Enhancing African peacekeeping capacities

76. AU and subregional organizations such as ECOWAS have played an increasingly prominent role in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The achievements of the ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and of AMIB before the deployment of full-scale United Nations peacekeeping operations have highlighted the importance of a close partnership with African organizations, which the United Nations will continue to do its part to foster. Ongoing innovations by the African Union to build a regional framework for peacekeeping are also noteworthy, as are bilateral efforts to assist AU and individual African States to build peacekeeping capacity.

77. Recent experience has demonstrated that in spite of political will and commitment to participate in peacekeeping activities, most African troop-contributing countries, and regional and subregional organizations, are constrained by inadequate strategic planning capabilities and serious difficulties in the deployment and sustainment of sizeable forces. As stated in my report on the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity (A/59/591), the United Nations is committed to enhancing African Member States' ability to contribute effectively to both United Nations and African-led peacekeeping operations in Africa and elsewhere, while assisting them in the development of capacities for the planning and management of peace operations.

78. In this regard, the United Nations Secretariat has provided technical advice, equipment sustainability and training. Aside from assisting AU in the conceptualization of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, the United Nations provided it with informal technical advice in preparation for its mission in Burundi and the deployment of its military observers in Darfur. The United Nations has established an assistance cell at AU headquarters to assist the AU Commission in managing its mission in Darfur. There has also been cooperation to strengthen the capacity of the AU Situation Room in Addis Ababa. The next phase of cooperation is aimed at enhancing communication between AU headquarters and field missions and offices by introducing improved electronic equipment and providing training to AU Situation Room personnel. In addition, there have been preliminary contacts with both ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States regarding the setting up of a monitoring capability similar to that of AU.

79. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has provided or supported training initiatives, such as generic peacekeeping training for over 200 military and

civilian police training officers, the sponsoring of officers from emerging African troop-contributing countries to courses run by current troop-contributing countries and pre-deployment training for individual contingents. United Nations peacekeeping training doctrine and materials are also geared towards augmenting African capacity to respond to the multidimensional nature of peacekeeping, by including issues such as human rights, gender, HIV/AIDS, rule of law and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

80. In order to further enhance African peacekeeping capacity, the following should be pursued by all actors: (a) the development of peacekeeping doctrine and training standards; (b) the provision of logistic support, including strategic sealift and airlift capabilities; and (c) the provision of financial resources. My report on the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacities provides a more detailed description of the various types of assistance that the United Nations could provide in each of those areas, given a clear mandate and sufficient resources.

V. Conduct and discipline

81. Over the past year, the number of allegations of sexual misconduct against United Nations peacekeeping personnel increased significantly. Between June and September 2004, the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigated 72 allegations, against both military and civilian peacekeeping personnel, of sexual exploitation and abuse of local Congolese girls in the town of Bunia alone, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I am outraged at any such acts of gross misconduct, and all measures will be taken to ensure that those responsible are held fully accountable. I therefore invited the Permanent Representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, to act as my Adviser on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

82. In October 2004, my Adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse undertook a preliminary assessment of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Further to that visit and the findings of the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation, I am deeply concerned to learn that the problem appears to be more serious and widespread than previously known. My Adviser has initiated informal consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries on the handling of cases of misconduct on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel, in lieu of the request by the Special Committee to convene a meeting with troop- and police-contributing countries to develop a common understanding and agreed procedures to handle cases of alleged misconduct by United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

83. Were the Special Committee to seek a comprehensive report with recommendations on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel, I would be prepared to undertake such a request, with due regard to the sensitivity of the subject matter. The report would likely have wider implications for the handling of misconduct in general, including the monitoring of and reporting on misconduct. In the meantime, the disciplinary directives continue to be the main mechanism for dealing with cases of alleged misconduct.

84. A number of ad hoc efforts, focusing on the prevention and identification of sexual misconduct, are under way. These include the piloting of training materials on sexual exploitation and abuse and the establishment of Personnel Conduct Officer positions in some of the larger missions.

VI. Security and safety of United Nations and associated personnel

85. The security and safety of United Nations staff continues to be a central concern as the United Nations carries out its peacekeeping mandates, often under dangerous conditions. The abduction of three United Nations staff members last October in Afghanistan reminded us of the challenge of increased direct threat faced by United Nations staff.

86. Further to my report on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365 and Corr.1), submitted to the General Assembly at its current session, on 22 December 2004 the Fifth Committee of the Assembly endorsed a new United Nations-wide security management system. It also recommended that the Assembly request me to provide, in the context of the implementation report to be presented at its sixtieth session, information on strengthening the cooperation between the new Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with respect to security decisions that may affect the conduct of peacekeeping operations, in the framework of the unified security management system, which would be led by the Department of Safety and Security.

87. In the light of the frequency and complexity of crisis situations affecting peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made significant efforts to develop better crisis-response procedures and to support missions with integrated, real-time guidance. The Situation Centre plays a central role as the coordinating body for any crisis response by the Department, managing the information flow between the field and Headquarters. In order to fulfil these tasks effectively, the 24-hour duty desks operated by the Situation Centre need to be strengthened.

88. The introduction of joint mission analysis cells, aimed at enhancing capacity to gather information for threat and risk analysis and security assessment in the field, has met with varying degrees of success, but thus far no mission has been able to introduce the concept in its full, multidimensional context, because funding has not yet been approved for the civilian posts within the cells. The effective establishment of a joint mission analysis cell within a United Nations mission in the Sudan will be of critical importance for its success.

89. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not have full-time staff dedicated to safety issues per se, with the exception of the area of aviation safety. In order to better coordinate and direct activities relating to safety matters, the terms of reference of the Department's Safety Council, established in 2002, have recently been revised and a new programme of safety-related work is being developed. However, in the absence of dedicated resources, the Department's ability to complete the programme of safety-related work will be limited by competing priorities.

90. The Department is attempting to improve its cooperation with Member States with regard to the conduct of investigations or inquiries into incidents leading to loss of life or serious injury among peacekeeping personnel. In addition, the effectiveness of the Boards of Inquiry is being reviewed.

VII. Observations

91. The formulation and development of each of the major proposals for strengthening peace operations over the past four years has benefited from a close dialogue with the Member States. The present report contains a number of proposals, including on strategic reserves and standing police capacity, that will do a great deal to further the efforts of United Nations peace operations to meet the growing demands and complexity our missions face today. I invite the Special Committee to discuss and develop these proposals with the Secretariat with a view to bringing them before the relevant legislative bodies for approval.

92. In conclusion, I wish once again to pay tribute to the men and women who have served and continue to serve in peacekeeping missions, and to those who have given their lives in the pursuit of international peace and security.

Notes

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/58/19).

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 109

Programme planning

Report of the Third Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Carlos Enrique **García González** (El Salvador)

At its 18th plenary meeting, on 4 October 2004, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to allocate item 109, entitled "Programme planning" to the Third Committee for its consideration of programme 19 of the proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007 (A/59/6 (Prog.19)).

At its 42nd meeting, on 11 November 2004, following statements by the representatives of Cuba and Venezuela, the Third Committee took note of programme 19 and decided to transmit it, through the President of the General Assembly, to the Fifth Committee for its consideration. Statements were made by the representatives of New Zealand, Guatemala, Mexico and Costa Rica (see A/C.3/59/SR.42).

The action taken by the Committee was communicated to the President of the General Assembly in a letter from the Chairman of the Third Committee dated 11 November 2004.

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Programme planning

Report of the Second Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Azanaw Tadesse **Abreha** (Ethiopia)

1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 17 September 2004, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of the fifty-ninth session the item entitled "Programme planning" and to allocate that aspect of the item that relates to Programme 10, Trade and development, of the proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007 to the Second Committee.

2. The Second Committee considered the item jointly with item 83 "Macroeconomic policy questions", sub-item (a) "International trade and development", at its 22nd meeting on 2 November 2004. An account of the Committee's discussion of the item is contained in the relevant summary record (A/C.2/59/SR.22).

3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its forty-fourth session;[1]

(b) Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007: Programme 10, Trade and development (A/59/6 (Prog.10) and A/59/6 (Prog.10)/Rev.1).

4. At its 22nd meeting, on 2 November 2004, the Vice-President of the Trade and Development Board and the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development made introductory statements.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee approved the recommendations as contained in document A/59/6 (Prog.10)/Rev.1, entitled, "Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007". The Chairman of the Second Committee subsequently sent a letter to the President of the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, dated 3 November 2004, requesting him to forward the recommendations of the Committee to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee.

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 16* (A/59/16).

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Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 15 December 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 23 November to 13 December 2004, inclusive.

These grave violations are part of a series of persistent and provocative Israeli violations of Lebanese territory, including air, sea and land, and intervene against the principles of international law, the resolutions of international legitimacy and the repeated calls of the United Nations for their cessation.

In view of these violations and the stepping-up of Israeli threats against Lebanon and the safety of its territory and its citizens, Lebanon relies upon the United Nations to deter and prevent Israel from indulging in such dangerous acts, which constitute a threat to international security and peace. Lebanon holds Israel fully responsible for any consequences to which those acts may lead.

In drawing your attention to the grave consequences of such acts, I request that this letter of compliant and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sami **Kronfol**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

04-64864 (E) 161204

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 December 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

23 November 2004

Between 1755 and 1800 hours, an Israeli gunboat in Lebanese territorial waters off Ras-Naqoura fired a flare shell and several bursts of medium machine-gun fire on the open sea.

24 November 2004

At 0929 hours, an Israeli gunboat in Lebanese territorial waters off Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine-gun fire on the open sea.

28 November 2004

At 1009 hours, Israeli occupation forces, positioned in Rweiset Alalam inside Chebaa farms, fired several bursts of medium machine-gun fire at the surroundings of this position.

At 1500 hours, an Israeli gunboat in Lebanese territorial waters off Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine-gun fire on the open sea.

29 November 2004

At 2215 hours, an Israeli gunboat in Lebanese territorial waters off Ras-Naqoura fired a flare shell on the open sea.

1 December 2004

Between 1028 and 1130 hours, eight Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes and entered from above the villages of Naqoura and Rmaiche.

- Six of these warplanes headed to the Bekaa and two headed to Jbeil and then to the Bekaa. The eight warplanes flew over Hermel and Baalback and then headed west and south.
- Four Israeli warplanes flew in a circular motion over Chekaa and Jbeil and left from above the sea at 1055 hours.
- Two warplanes left at 1116 hours from above Alma Elchab.
- Two warplanes left at 1130 hours from above Rmaiche.

Between 1035 and 1325 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes and entered from above Rmaiche, headed north and circled South Lebanon.

2 December 2004

Between 1022 and 1420 hours, an Israeli drone aircraft violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude and entered from above the sea facing Saida, headed north, and circled over Khalde.

Between 1944 and 2220 hours, an Israeli drone aircraft violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude and entered from above the sea off Saida, headed north, and circled over Beirut and Damour.

5 December 2004

Between 1015 and 1210 hours, Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace and broke the sound barrier at a high altitude over South Lebanon.

12 December 2004

Between 1110 and 1150 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes over Tripoli.

13 December 2004

Between 1755 and 2110 hours, an Israeli drone aircraft violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea off Tyre, headed to Beirut and circled over Khalde and Saida.

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Culture of peace

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations: cooperation between the United Nations and the Association of South-East Asian Nations

Letter dated 14 December 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour on behalf of the member countries of the Association of the South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, to inform you that the tenth ASEAN summit and its related summit meetings were held on 29 and 30 November 2004, in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic.

At the tenth ASEAN summit, ASEAN leaders signed the Vientiane Action Programme, a six-year plan, which is the successor of the Hanoi Plan of Action, to realize the end goal of the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. The Vientiane Action Programme focuses on deepening regional integration and narrowing development gaps within ASEAN, in particular the least developed member countries.

In that connection, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Development Fund to support the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme and future action programmes. To that end, they called on their Dialogue Partners, other countries and regional and international organizations to support the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme (see http://www.aseansec.org/).

I have the further honour to submit a copy of the press statement issued by the Chairman of the tenth ASEAN summit and its related summit meetings on 30 November 2004 (see annex). I would like to kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as documents of the General Assembly under the agenda

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items entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Association of South-East Asian Nations" and "Culture of peace".

(*Signed*) Alounkeo **Kittikhoun**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Chairman of the ASEAN New York Committee

Annex to the letter dated 14 December 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Chairman's Press Statement

10th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits
Vientiane, 29-30 November 2004

1. The 10th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Republic of Korea), ASEAN+China, ASEAN+Japan, ASEAN+ROK, ASEAN+India Summits, and ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Commemorative Summit were held on 29-30 November 2004 in Vientiane under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Bounnhang VORACHITH, Prime Minister of the Lao PDR. The ASEAN Leaders and the Leaders of their Dialogue Partners attending these Summits jointly signed or adopted 32 important documents.

2. The Heads of States and Government of ASEAN, China, Japan, ROK, India, and Australia and New Zealand attended the above mentioned relevant Summits.

I. The 10th ASEAN Summit

3. At this Summit, the ASEAN Leaders exchanged views on regional and international political and economic issues, including:

(1) Terrorism

The ASEAN Leaders strongly condemned the recent terrorist acts and reaffirmed their unwavering determination to strengthen their cooperation to mitigate the adverse impact of such attacks on ASEAN countries, and urged the international community to support and assist ASEAN in this effort.

(2) Korean Peninsular

The ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsular, and agreed that there is a need to continue the discussions to promote mutual confidence and find a common approach to the issue. In this connection, the ASEAN Leaders called on all parties concerned to reconvene the Six-Party Talks at the earliest possibility.

(3) Middle East

The ASEAN Leaders expressed their concern over the violent situation in the Middle East and called for the creation of an independent Palestinian State living side by side with Israel within secure and internationally recognized borders that will bring about lasting peace in the Middle East.

(4) Iraq

The ASEAN Leaders expressed their concern over the grave situation in Iraq and called for the holding of an election as scheduled, and reaffirmed their position that the United Nations must continue to play a central role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq.

4. The ASEAN Leaders focused their discussions on the acceleration of ASEAN integration and the narrowing of the development gap within ASEAN and between ASEAN and other countries by calling on the Dialogue Partners to support the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), the Vientiane Declaration on the establishment of a Development Triangle among Cambodia, Lao and Vietnam, and the Vientiane Declaration on Enhancing Economic Cooperation and Integration among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam as well as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).

5. The ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), as a Code of Conduct governing relations between countries in the region for the promotion of regional peace and stability and welcomed the accession to the TAC by the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, and called on other non-Southeast Asian countries to consider acceding to the Treaty.

6. The ASEAN Leaders signed the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), a six-year plan (2004-2010), which is the successor to the Hanoi Plan of Action. The VAP is aimed at accelerating the integration of ASEAN and narrowing the development gap within ASEAN. The implementation of the VAP will lead to the realization of the goals set in the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, which is the establishment of an ASEAN Community comprising 3 pillars, namely an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community in 2020. This will move ASEAN forward towards shared prosperity and destiny in an integrated, peaceful and caring community.

7. To provide synergies for the fruitful implementation of the VAP as well as plans of action or programmes in the future, the ASEAN Leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Development Fund (ADF), which is a new decision made at the Summit.

8. The ASEAN Leaders also signed the ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors, aimed at turning ASEAN into a single market and production base so as to progress towards the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community in 2020 as set forth in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II.

9. In addition, to implement the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, the ASEAN Leaders adopted Plans of Action of ASEAN Security Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

10. The ASEAN Leaders also adopted the ASEAN Joint Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children.

11. The ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed the importance of regional integration and the narrowing of the development gap within ASEAN, and welcomed progress made in the implementation of IAI and the Roadmap for the integration of ASEAN over the past year.

12. The ASEAN Leaders also took note of the outcomes of the Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam (CLMV) Summit and Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam (CLV) Summit.

13. The ASEAN Leaders noted progress made in the implementation of initiatives and projects under the cooperation framework between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners.

14. The ASEAN Leaders agreed to convene an East Asia Summit (EAS) in Malaysia in 2005, and tasked their ASEAN Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials to work out the details relating to the Summit and the question of participation.

15. The ASEAN Leaders also agreed to convene the Second ASEAN-UN Summit in New York in 2005 during the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly.

16. The ASEAN Leaders took note of a report by the ASEAN Business Advisory Council.

II. ASEAN+3 Summit

17. The Summit exchanged views on a number of regional and international political and economic issues, particularly on the challenges facing the region and the world, such as recent developments on terrorism, the Korean Peninsular, the situation in Iraq and the Middle East as well as the outbreak of avian flu.

18. The ASEAN+3 Leaders welcomed the accession to the TAC by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Russian Federation on the occasion of this Summit.

19. The hike in oil prices has brought about an adverse impact on economies of the region. Therefore, the ASEAN+3 Leaders agreed to support energy cooperation in particular alternative energy such as biofuels and hydroelectric power. In addition, they noted the outcomes of the 1st ASEAN+3 Energy Ministers Meeting, held in June 2004 in the Philippines.

20. The ASEAN+3 Leaders expressed their satisfaction with the overall progress of the ASEAN+3 cooperation and agreed to further implement the short-term and long-term measures of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), that they had adopted in 2002.

21. The ASEAN+3 Leaders noted that the establishment of an East Asia Community is a long-term objective. In addition, they noted that there is a need to develop an Asian Bond Market and to prevent the outbreak of emerging diseases through new mechanisms such as the setting up of "Outbreak Response Teams."

22. The ASEAN+3 Leaders exchanged views on the establishment of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and welcomed the decision by the ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers to set up an expert group to conduct a feasibility study on EAFTA.

23. To mark the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN+3 relations in 2007, the ASEAN+3 Leaders agreed to consider the idea of issuing the second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, as well as a work plan to consolidate the existing and further cooperation.

24. The Plus Three countries Leaders welcomed the endorsement of the VAP and expressed their support to ASEAN in implementing activities and projects in support of the VAP.

25. Furthermore, the Leaders of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea welcomed the CLMV and CLV Summits, and expressed their support to the implementation of the Vientiane Declaration on Enhancing Economic Cooperation and Integration among Cambodia, Laos Myanmar and Vietnam, and the Vientiane Declaration on the Establishment of the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle. The ASEAN Leaders expressed their appreciation to China, Japan and ROK for their assistance in implementing projects under the IAI Work Plan.

III. ASEAN+China Summit

26. The ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the One China Policy and believed that maintaining peace and stability across Taiwan Straits conforms to the common aspiration of all countries in the region.

27. China commended ASEAN for the signing of the VAP as well as the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Integration of Priority Sectors and the Protocols, and expressed its support to the implementation of the VAP, which will contribute to the realization of the goals set in the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. The Leaders of ASEAN and China adopted the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

28. The Leaders of ASEAN and China welcomed the signing of the Agreement of Trade in Goods and Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China.

29. The ASEAN Leaders welcomed China's intention to contribute another US$5 million dollars to the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund in 2005.

30. China reaffirmed its commitment to further strengthen the cooperation with ASEAN in the five priority areas, namely agriculture, information and communication technology (ICT), human resource development (HRD), Mekong Basin development and mutual investment and cooperate in other areas such as SMEs, public health, science and technology as well as quality supervision, inspection, and quarantine inspection. China reiterated its continued support for ASEAN's integration through various development initiatives such as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC), Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), and Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS).

31. The Leaders of ASEAN and China expressed support for Asia's turn to assume the position of United Nations Secretary-General. In this regard, China was pleased to be informed of ASEAN's endorsement of the candidature of H.E. Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, for this position.

IV. ASEAN+Japan Summit

32. The ASEAN and Japan Leaders adopted the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight Against International Terrorism, and noted with satisfaction the Executive Report on the Progress made in Implementation of the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action adopted at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit held in Tokyo in December 2003.

33. The ASEAN Leaders expressed their appreciation to Japan for its support for the VAP and its assistance in ASEAN's integration through various ASEAN initiatives and projects, namely IAI, Mekong Basin Development, East-West Corridor and others. Japan welcomed the CLMV and the CLV Summits and expressed its support to the implementation of the Vientiane Declaration on Enhancing Economic Cooperation and Integration among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, and the Vientiane Declaration on the Establishment of the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle.

34. The ASEAN and Japan Leaders exchanged views on UN reform, in particular, the reform of the Security Council.

35. The Leaders of ASEAN and Japan noted the progress on the implementation of the Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) between ASEAN and Japan signed last year, and agreed that ASEAN-Japan CEP Agreement Negotiation should commence in 2005.

V. ASEAN+ROK Summit

36. The ASEAN and ROK Leaders signed the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Economic Partnership between the Association of Southeast Asia Nations and the Republic of Korea. This document charts the future direction for cooperation and provides a basis for Free Trade Area Negotiation between ASEAN and ROK.

37. The ASEAN Leaders welcomed the ROK's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) on 27 November 2004.

38. The ASEAN Leaders expressed their high appreciation for the ROK's decision to increase its contribution to the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund.

VI. ASEAN+India Summit

39. The ASEAN and India Leaders exchanged views on international and regional issues, especially terrorism, the situation in the Middle East and Iraq, the Korean Peninsular, and UN reform.

40. The ASEAN and India Leaders signed the document on ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity, and adopted a Plan of Action for the implementation of this Partnership.

41. The ASEAN and India Leaders agreed to carry out cooperation in the sectors of trade, investment, services, health, information technology, human resource development and bio-energy.

42. The ASEAN and India Leaders witnessed the ASEAN-India Car Rally Flag- off, aimed at promoting ASEAN-India relations and connectivity.

VII. ASEAN+Australia and New Zealand Commemorative Summit

43. The Leaders of ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand held discussions on regional and international issues of mutual interest.

44. They signed a Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Commemorative Summit. This landmark document provides a basis for further intensifying and expanding cooperation between ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand for the interests of their peoples and for peace, stability, sustained development and prosperity in the region.

45. The ASEAN Leaders urged Australia and New Zealand to accede to the TAC.

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Programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Modalities, format and organization of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly

Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/59/L.53

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the statement submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/59/25), in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the programme budget implications of paragraphs 1 to 6 and 8 of draft resolution A/59/L.53.

2. The overall resource requirements related to the implementation of the draft resolution amount to $1,727,800, as detailed in paragraphs 3 to 12 of the Secretary-General's statement. However, for the reasons given in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his statement, additional resource requirements related to the activities provided for under the terms of the draft resolution are estimated at $1,060,700 (at 2004-2005 rates) under the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005.

3. **The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the statement of programme budget implications should have provided a better analysis of resource requirements and, in terms of existing capacity, of possibilities for absorption and redeployment. For example, the Committee questions why only $350,000 out of $777,100 for public information activities was reported as subject to absorption; the Committee notes that the budget of the Department of Public Information for 2004-2005 amounts to approximately $156.0 million**

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and was informed that so far some $77.0 million had been allotted and some $66.0 million had been committed during 2004. The Committee points out that for an event as important as the High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, the Secretariat should make a greater effort to reorder priorities so as to accommodate these activities from within existing resources.

4. Further, the Advisory Committee points out that the Secretary-General's statement of programme budget implications gives no indication of potential savings under section 9 of the programme budget for 2004-2005 for travel of staff resulting from the fact that the substantive secretariat of the Economic and Social Council would not have to travel to Geneva, even taking into account the need for certain staff to travel to New York from Geneva and the regional commissions.

5. In addition to the foregoing, the Advisory Committee has identified a number of areas where economies should be possible, including general temporary assistance where, for example, the Committee is of the opinion that the nine months of general temporary assistance at the P-2 level requested for a project assistant could be met from within existing resources. Additionally, the resources requested for protocol should also be given a second look in view of the short duration of the Meeting and the nature of that function. Savings should also be possible for overtime, travel of staff, rental of equipment and publication costs. The Committee is furthermore of the opinion that a greater effort should be made to utilize in-house capacity in language services, even given the calendar of conferences at the time the High-level Meeting is foreseen.

6. Under the circumstances, the Advisory Committee recommends that every effort be made to absorb the requested amount. Such additional resource requirements as may be necessary can be reflected in the second performance report for the biennium 2004-2005. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Fifth Committee inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt draft resolution A/59/L.53, no additional appropriation would arise at this time, pending submission of the second performance report.